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Lightening The Marine Corps


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#121 Burncycle360

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Posted 09 April 2020 - 0955 AM

There does, IMO need to be a new white paper and title 10 reform redefining task and purposes with clearer roles and responsibilities and less overlap and redundancy.
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#122 JasonJ

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Posted 09 April 2020 - 1008 AM

I had already mentioned Korea, Stuart, as a longer termed border conflict. The Chinese did give warning to the UN forces not to go north, after all.

Here's the real reason for listening to this at the time:

http://www.tank-net....30453&p=1376968

 

 

Disturbing... in various ways...

 

The American songbook is not usually inspiration for the People’s Liberation Army but on Wednesday it set the tone for a banquet held in Beijing for visiting US Defence Secretary James Mattis.

The tough official talks of Mattis’ three-day trip were set aside for the dinner as – in a rare gesture – PLA performer Cai Guoqing sang Edelweiss, a standard from the US musical The Sound of Music.

“Edelweiss, Edelweiss, every morning you greet me. Small and white, clean and bright, you look happy to meet me,” Cai sang, welcoming Mattis to the banquet hosted by Chinese Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe.

 

...

https://www.scmp.com...s-defence-chief


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#123 Nobu

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Posted 09 April 2020 - 1316 PM

Going back on subject, for a moment, I did some digging on the Army's current watercraft fleet just to see the status of how many floaty things they had with a bow ramp which could drop a tank ashore. Turns out it's about 35 LLCs (4 tanks per), and the Navy's got another 30+ LCUs (1 or 2 tanks). The Army's LCM-8 is too small to take anything bigger than an M60, construction has started on the prototype of a new MSV-L to replace it. Plus, I guess there's no reason the Navy can't stick Army heavy units onto an amphib with LCACs.

 

So apparently the Army is still in the 'landing on enemy shores' business, if not the 'opposed landing' business. I wonder if there's an official division of labour between when the Marines are supposed to hit the beach vs Army. Also I might wonder when's the last time an Army unit did anything with those ships in larger than company strength.

 

The last opposed river crossing, possibly. Not sure how far back, or which war, that would date back to.

 

I would be surprised if there was not an official division, for administrative purposes if anything else.


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#124 Jeff

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Posted 09 April 2020 - 1534 PM

It would not be the very first nation that is crazy to go to war with its neighbours. Nazi Germany had little realistic hope of winning WW2, but that didnt stop it embarking on it. Ditto Kaisers Germany. Napoleon, the Carthaginians, the history books are full of them.

 

Can I imagine circumstances in which it would happen? Well I dont think China WANTS a war. But it may feel constrained in the future. It clearly feels it from Trumps own policies. We cant tell what they would feel threatened by, but a block on their goods by America, Japanese rearmament, South Korean reintegration, Taiwanese declared independence, a war in Iran or its resource sites attacked by terrorists in Africa, all of these in singular or in combination might be enough to convince China to get off its butt and exercise its will. Which in some circumstances might be to our advantage, but not necessarily so.

 

Im reminded of something I read in a book on Kissinger, about when he met Mao. Kissinger made a comment, and Mao replied something about being a Monk, that defied any understanding even when the translation was made. It took 25 years for an academic in the US to accurately figure out what Mao was actually saying and translate it. The basic point im making is, China is foreign. Far more than any other asian nation (other than perhaps North Korea), and whilst in many respects they have westernized, we probably should not mistake that as thinking their mindset and world outlook is identical to ours. It doesnt make them wrong, or evil, or crazy, though like our leaders some of them may be one or all of those. It  just means that what looks reasonable to us, may look wholly unreasonable to them, and vice versa.

 

Agreed. When you're dealing with dictatorships particularly, all kinds of things can happen if the mood strikes the leadership. The leadership often has a very different view of the world than others, particularly when dealing with a very alien culture to begin with. China will rue the day they turned their back on post Deng Xiaoping term limits and adopted the cult of Xi. The world may as well.


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#125 Ken Estes

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Posted 09 April 2020 - 1545 PM

There's no need to redefine roles and missions. The US Army made more landings in WWII than did the USMC; no surprise, given the respective numbers.

 

Last was:

Operation Uphold Democracy: 

19 September 1994 – 31 March 1995
(6 months, 1 week and 5 days)

82d Airborne deployment to Haiti was via various USN ships and others.But their was no amphibious operation.

 

 

The operation began with the alert of United States and its allies for a forced entry into the island nation of HaitiU.S. NavyU.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Air Force elements staged to Puerto Rico and southern Florida to prepare to support the airborne invasion, spearheaded by elements of the Joint Special Operations Command[1][specify] (HQ, 75th Ranger Regiment), followed by 3rd Special Forces Group, the US Army 7th Transportation Group (Army watercraft and terminal elements) and the 10th Mountain Division. Some of these elements were staged out of Hunter Army Airfield and Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. The 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division deployed to Haiti aboard the U.S.S Eisenhower.[2][3] The operation was directed by Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton[who?], Joint Task Force 120 (JTF-120), provided by Commander, Carrier Group Two.[4]

 

 

19 September 1994 – 31 March 1995
(6 months, 1 week and 5 days)
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#126 Ken Estes

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Posted 09 April 2020 - 1549 PM

There's no need to redefine roles and missions. The US Army made more landings in WWII than did the USMC; no surprise, given the respective numbers.

 

Last was:

Operation Uphold Democracy: 

19 September 1994 – 31 March 1995
(6 months, 1 week and 5 days)

82d Airborne etc. deployment to Haiti was via various USN ships and others.But theirs was no amphibious operation.

 

 

The operation began with the alert of United States and its allies for a forced entry into the island nation of HaitiU.S. NavyU.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Air Force elements staged to Puerto Rico and southern Florida to prepare to support the airborne invasion, spearheaded by elements of the Joint Special Operations Command[1][specify] (HQ, 75th Ranger Regiment), followed by 3rd Special Forces Group, the US Army 7th Transportation Group (Army watercraft and terminal elements) and the 10th Mountain Division. Some of these elements were staged out of Hunter Army Airfield and Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. The 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division deployed to Haiti aboard the U.S.S Eisenhower.[2][3] The operation was directed by Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton[who?], Joint Task Force 120 (JTF-120), provided by Commander, Carrier Group Two.[4]

 

 

19 September 1994 – 31 March 1995
(6 months, 1 week and 5 days)


Edited by Ken Estes, 09 April 2020 - 1615 PM.

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#127 Nobu

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Posted 11 April 2020 - 2252 PM

Was somewhat surprised to read of the minor role the USMC played in Just Cause/Panama. Most if not all of that assault was from the air.

 

The 75th Ranger Regiment appears to have been the spearhead of choice in the 1990s.


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#128 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 12 April 2020 - 0151 AM

Probably someone in the JCS just had the right tongue in the right orifice at the time is all. After all, they used the Stealth Fighter and the Apache at the same time, but there was no logical reason to do so.


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#129 Ken Estes

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Posted 12 April 2020 - 1149 AM

Was somewhat surprised to read of the minor role the USMC played in Just Cause/Panama. Most if not all of that assault was from the air.

 

The 75th Ranger Regiment appears to have been the spearhead of choice in the 1990s.

 

Marines under Armor, p. 183:

....

 

            The next overseas expedition brought the new LAV units into play, an ideal constabulary role for these vehicles and troops. As tensions grew between the U.S. forces in the Panama Canal Zone and the local government, the theater commander, General Frederick Woerner, requested these unique vehicles as reinforcements for his garrison forces.  Companies of the 2d LAI Battalion began to rotate into the zone every three to four months, beginning in May, 1989. When Gen. Woerner decided to begin the action on 20 December, D Company, 2d LAI had its place in the sun. Using 14 LAV-25s manned with 10 scout teams drawn from a force security company, the LAI platoons overran government troops posts, broke roadblocks, protected the U.S. embassy and supported other units with fire. The vehicles and troops performed well against very light resistance. [ii]


 

[ii] Nicholas E. Reynolds. Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama 1988-1990 (Washington, 1996), 15, 22-26.

​

 


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#130 Nobu

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Posted 12 April 2020 - 1303 PM

Could definitely see that being the case, with Army units seeking to carve out an elite status of their own then.

 

Another reason could have been wanting to avoid the optics of Marines fighting banana wars in Central America once again. 

 

Nicholas E. Reynolds. Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama 1988-1990 (Washington, 1996),

 

Thanks for the citation, on the to-read list. The phrase that came to mind at the time was "lightning war."


Edited by Nobu, 12 April 2020 - 1527 PM.

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#131 Ken Estes

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Posted 12 April 2020 - 1538 PM

PDF is here:

 

https://www.usmcu.ed...0-29-081840-220


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#132 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 13 April 2020 - 0203 AM

Yes, thats the nice thing about US Government publications, you can download them for free. :)


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#133 Ken Estes

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Posted 17 April 2020 - 1641 PM

If we actually were worried about China, we'd stop giving them our tech and money and stop educating their people, as well as letting them get a head start on the invasion, err immigration.  Until then, it's all smoke and bullshit.

 

This current CMC is what would have happened if Van Riper had made CMC.  S/F....Ken M

 

Ken, you proved most prescient in this. The new CMC's faith in wargaming presumes nobody will be led astray by the same. Check this one:

 

https://breakingdefe...t-amphib-ships/

 

Marines.jpg

 

 

Marine Commandant: Less A Second Land Army, More Light Amphib Ships

"You'll see some significant changes” in the Navy report “regarding the portion of the fleet that supports maneuver of Marines and the expeditionary elements of that," Gen. David Berger says.

By   PAUL MCLEARYon April 03, 2020 at 4:38 PM

 

WASHINGTON: Defense Secretary Mark Esper has been “very supportive” of bold new Marine Corps plans to jettison its tanks, cut artillery units, slash the number of helicopter squadrons, and rethink the role F-35s might play, Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger told reporters this week, suggesting he’s just getting started in remaking the Corps.

“We’re more at the beginning than we are at the end” of carving out deep changes in the force structure of the Corps to meet the challenges of Chinese and Russian military modernization, Berger said. 

It’s important to note that while Esper said no to the Navy’s shipbuilding and force structure plans, a decision he received significant grief from lawmakers over, he gave the green light tot Berger’s force structure plan  released last month.

The approval of Berger’s vision, at least in its early form, could be a signal of Esper’s thinking about the wider shift for the Navy as well. Berger plans to lop off a significant portion of the Corps’ traditional strength — artillery, armor, and rotary wing lift — in favor of a leaner, more precise and much faster force. The Navy, conversely, while pledging to move forward with some unmanned ship plans, generally wants to retain its hulking aircraft carriers, dozens of big deck amphibs, and an aging destroyer fleet while introducing a new frigate to the mix.

It’s not clear that is the direction Esper wants to go. One thing the combined Marine/Navy team is working on is a new class of small amphibious ships that could set sail as early as  2023 that would be smaller and faster than the current gator fleet, a major shift in how Marines are transported to the fight.

“I laid out in detail the areas where we would be reducing or getting rid of certain capabilities,” Berger told me during the roundtable, “and the areas where we’re going to build up, and he was very supportive. His sense of the National Defense Strategy is clear and, until that that scenario changes, this is the vector we need to be on.”

Berger’s reference to the Pacific-focused NDS underscores his intent to make the force lighter, faster, and more responsive to the threats in the Pacific, while also pulling away from the grinding land wars of the past two decades.   

“We need to do less duplication of a second sort of land army and more to provide the nation unique capabilities that an amphibious and maritime and expeditionary crisis response force provides,” he said, meaning the Marines seven companies’ worth of M1 Abrams tanks are going to go away. “What we do not want to do was replicate what the Army is already very, very good at.”  

 

It’s not only immensely heavy tanks that will disappear. Other legacy platforms like heavy- and medium-helicopter squadrons and towed artillery are also on the chopping block. In addition, the plan calls for eliminating law enforcement units, bridging companies, three infantry battalions, and anti-aircraft units.

While he has previously questioned the need for the Navy’s requirement of 38 amphibious ships to haul Marines across the globe, Berger has promoted the idea of a new class of light amphibious warships, lightly crewed, to get smaller groups of Marines to the fight ashore without being such large targets.

The Navy’s fleet assessment, on hold until Esper’s office finishes its own review this summer, should include that new ship. 

Berger offered a bit of a preview, telling me during the roundtable, “you’ll see some significant changes” in the Navy report “regarding the portion of the fleet that supports maneuver of Marines and the expeditionary elements of that. They also see a pretty significant shift towards unmanned platforms, and where we need to go in that regard. There is a linkage between the two.”

While he didn’t elaborate, his comments suggest unmanned platforms could team with the new ships to screen approaches to beaches and provide surveillance and fire support if needed. 

In briefing slides presented to the defense industry last month, the Navy said it plans to begin buying the 200- 400 ft. Light Amphibious Warships  ships in 2023, and it is looking for mature commercial designs that can carry a crew of 30 and travel 3,500 nautical miles.

One of the biggest surprises in the 10-year force assessment the Marines issued was the open questioning of the role the F-35 might play in the Corps’ future. It called for a change in how many planes are contained in each F-35 squad, from 16 to 10. Current plans call for the Marines to buy 353 of the F-35B and 67 of the F-35C carrier variants. It’s unclear whether this is the beginning of a smaller official plan to buy F-35Bs.

Berger affirmed this week that “there’s nothing like” the F-35 anywhere in the world, but he needs more information about the long-term costs of the plane’s readiness and maintainability.

“If the maintenance readiness of the F-35 proves to be very, very strong, then of course, like any other system you need less of them because more of them are up all the time,” he said, but, “on the other hand, if it turns out not to be so, then you’re going to need more of them, to account for the ones that are in repair, that are down right now.”

He tried to assuage some concerns that he was looking to walk away from the Joint Strike Fighter program. “Right now, the program of record plows ahead as it is,” the general said. “But I’m signaling to the industry, we have to be prepared to adjust as the operating environment adjusts. Right now, the program of record stays the same, but we will,  we must, adapt to the adversary and we must adapt to the operating environment that we’re challenged with being in.”

​

 

Then there is this one:

 

https://www.marineco...re-battlefield/

 

Top Marine says Light Armored Reconnaissance is outmoded on future battlefield

 

The top Marine told reporters Wednesday that current layout and organization of the Corps’ Light Armored Reconnaissance units were better equipped to handle another conflict in the Middle East instead of rising near-peer rivals.

The comments from the Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David Berger come as the Corps announced it was axing all of its tank battalions as part of an effort to modernized and redesign the force to contend with more sophisticated enemy forces.

 

Light Armored Reconnaissance today is built great for another Desert Shield, Desert Storm,” Berger said Wednesday. “I don’t see that likelihood as being very great.”

The Corps’ light armored vehicle, or LAV, is decades old and the Corps has spent years slapping new upgrades and weapons to help boost survivability of the vehicle. The Corps is looking at potential prototypes to replace its LAV fleet, but that could be a decade away.

 

https://www.marineco...anks-heres-why/

The Marines want to get rid of their tanks. Here’s why.

“We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this capability [tanks], despite its long and honorable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future,” the report said about the divestment of Marine tanks.

The future of LAR rests within manned and unmanned teaming, the ability to do collections at sea and operate autonomously or semi-autonomously with a lighter footprint, Berger explained. The top Marine noted that reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance was vital to a fight against near-peer rivals.

“No question in my mind” when going up against a capable adversary “that it pays to be spread out and dispersed,” Berger told reporters Wednesday.

“What we have to do now is transition to a lighter footprint, more expeditionary, more in support of a littoral environment,” Berger said. Can that unit “collect forward of itself even if offshore into the water.”

As part of the Corps’ effort to redesign the force over the next 10 years, the Marines are cutting tanks, reducing F-35 squadrons from 16 to 10 aircraft, cutting some rotary wing assets and cannon artillery, among others. The Corps says it plans to cut 12,000 personnel over the 10-year period.

A series of wargames conducted between 2018 and 2019 helped inform the Corps’ decision to divest of tanks and outmoded units and equipment that will have trouble surviving in fight with peer adversaries like China, according to a Marine Corps force redesign report.

From those wargames the Corps learned that the unit that shoots first has a “decisive advantage” on the battlefield and forces that can operate inside the range of enemy long-range precision fires “are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the ”weapons engagement zone, the report reads.

The Corps’ decision to divest of tanks, cut ground cannon artillery and light attack air platforms has stoked some criticism. Tanks historically have had success in high-end and urban warfare for decades boasting devastating firepower highly lethal to ground forces.

But tanks and armored vehicles have had trouble surviving against the threat of precision strike and the plethora of drone and reconnaissance systems flooding conflict zones across the Middle East.

“Mobility inside the WEZ [ weapons engagement zone] is a competitive advantage and an operational imperative,” the Marine Corps report reads.

The Corps instead is looking for mobile systems and units that can survive within the reach of precision fires to “attrit adversary forces," create dilemmas for the enemy and “consume adversary ISR resources,” according to the report.

 

 

 

​

 

And for an overdose:

 

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/04/02/marine-corps-1st-new-littoral-regiment-will-be-based-japan.html

 

The Marine Corps' 1st New Littoral Regiment Will Be Headquartered in Japan

 

2 Apr 2020

Military.com | By Gina Harkins

 

The first of three new units the Marine Corps will design to fight in hotly contested maritime spaces will operate in the Asia-Pacific region, the service's top leader said this week.

Leaders are working through plans this year to stand up a new Marine littoral regiment, Commandant Gen. David Berger told reporters Wednesday. The MLR, as Berger calls it, will be a new naval expeditionary force formation based in Hawaii and will fall under the Japan-based III Marine Expeditionary Force.

"We are already convinced, based on war games and modeling so far, that we have a fairly good idea of what an MLR with [III Marine Expeditionary Force] ... could look like," Berger said.

....

 

 

I have to wonder about this gold plated notion that so-called 'legacy' systems and organizations are just soooo bad.


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#134 Jeff

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Posted 17 April 2020 - 1758 PM

So we need about 40k Marines for this maritime police force on steroids? I thought we were going to have a Marine Corps for the next 500 years, I never thought 500 years would end so quickly. Once again, I think it's a disaster unless I hear some amazing stuff I haven't heard yet that suddenly makes sense. If this happens and there ever is a war with China then the Marines better get the heck out of the way or they might get hurt. My heart goes out to the Marines, past and present. The Few, the lightly armed, the useless in a real war.  :(


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#135 Nobu

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Posted 17 April 2020 - 2255 PM

"Berger has promoted the idea of a new class of light amphibious warships..."

 

At least they will be transported to that real war in a brand new class of warship. 

 

LCS Mark 2.


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#136 Ken Estes

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Posted 18 April 2020 - 1439 PM

From Bill Lind:

 

   https://www.traditio...commit-suicide/

 

The View From Olympus: Did the Marine Corps Just Commit Suicide?

The new Marine Corps Commandant, General David H. Berger, recently announced a series of major changes in the Marine Corps’ mission and structure.  When General Berger released his Commandant’s Guidance last summer, I supported it strongly. But the actions he just announced are so mis-directed that I fear they may add up to the suicide of the Marine Corps.

According to the Commandant’s letter announcing the Corps’ redirection,

The Marine Corps is redesigning the force for naval expeditionary warfare in actively contested spaces, fully aligning the Service with the direction of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). . .

Some of the key changes that will shape the future force include:

  • Expansion of long-range fires.  A 300% increase in rocket artillery.
  • Marine Littoral Regiment.  These purpose-built naval combined arms units will be capable of long-range precision-fires and equipped with anti-ship missiles.
  • Lighter, more mobile and versatile infantry.
  • Ground combat units to focus on naval missions.
  • Aviation units re-scoped for naval missions.
  • Investments in unmanned systems.
  • New capabilities for maritime mobility and resilience.
  • Air defense improvements.

The Marine Corps subsequently identified the cuts it will make to existing force structure to free resources for the new programs.  These will include all tanks, sixteen of twenty-one tube artillery batteries, three infantry battalions, some F-35s, and significant numbers of helicopters.  Total personnel strength will drop by 12,000.

Most of the critical response thus far has focused on the cuts to force structure.  On the whole, I do not see them as too problematic, although I would keep three tank companies and all existing infantry battalions.  Some of what General Berger is calling for is good, including making infantry lighter and more mobile (assuming that includes becoming true light rather than line infantry) and moving toward more, smaller amphibious ships, some based on commercial designs.

Unfortunately, the mistakes here cut far deeper than fewer or more units of this or that.  The proposed changes include three strategic errors, at least two of which are sufficient alone to put the Marine Corps’ continued existence in peril.  They are:

  • Re-aligning the Corps to the NDS, which is to say focusing on war with China.  We are not going to fight a war with China, because China is a nuclear power. Nuclear powers do not fight each other conventionally because the risk of escalation to nuclear war is too great.  The whole NDS is a work of fiction, designed to justify patterns and levels of defense spending that flow out of the Cold War or in some cases (especially the Navy) World War II (a cynic might say all our services have become clubs for World War II reenactors).  Worse still, General Berger’s changes build a fiction inside a fiction, namely that when we fight China the Marine Corps’ mission will be taking Chinese-held islands, presumably in the South China Sea. In the war with Japan, Marines took Japanese-held islands to create a chain leading to air bases that put us in bombing range of Japan.  The islands now held by China, except Hainan, have no strategic significance. In World War II, we bypassed such islands (thereby undermining Japan’s strategy). Even Hainan is significant only as the base for the South China fleet. Fleets are mobile. If we took Hainan, it would simply sail north. What all this adds up to is re-configuring the Marine Corps for a campaign that makes no sense in a war that will not happen.  That great blunder puts the Corp’s existence in peril.
  • So does a second blunder: focusing on “hi-tech” war built around long-range fires.  The Marine Corps survived the 20th century because it offered capabilities the other services did not.  The U.S. military already has a vast surplus of long-range fires, courtesy of the Navy and the Air Force.  Now, with these changes, the Corps will define its capability as adding a pea-shooter to a broadside of 16-inch guns.  Even if we take our fictitious scenario as real, the Chinese would not even notice the Marine Corps was involved. Becoming like the other services, a strategic blunder the Marine Corp began making in the mid-1990s and will now carry forward aggressively, means we won’t need a Marine Corps any more, except perhaps a battalion of embassy guards.
  • A third strategic blunder will probably not be noticed outside the Marine Corps but it will nonetheless reduce the value of what the Corps offers the nation.  While the Commandant references maneuver warfare with regard to dispersing amphibious forces, a move that has merit, focusing on trading long-range fires with any opponent marks a return to a firepower/attrition understanding of war.  In effect, it says future war will be a contest between trebuchets flinging pianos at each other. If we look around the world, that is not where war is going. In almost every case, state armed services that have vast superiority in long-range fires over their Fourth Generation opponents are losing, including us in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  Doctrinally, the Commandant’s vision faces backwards.

There is an obvious alternative that solves all three problems: return to the vision the Commandant first laid out in his Commandant’s guidance and focus on making maneuver warfare something the Marine Corps actually does instead of just writes about, including the changes in education, training, and personnel policies he identified.  Then, let the other services make the blunder of re-shaping themselves to accord with the fictional NDS and go instead where war is going, to become the nation’s force of choice for Fourth Generation war overseas. Just as the other services neglected amphibious warfare during the 1920s and ‘30s and the Marine Corps of that time created a unique capability the country ended up needing, so it can do the same now with 4GW.  It need not follow the other lemmings over a cliff.


Edited by Ken Estes, 20 April 2020 - 1827 PM.

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#137 Colin

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Posted 03 June 2020 - 2215 PM

The USMC will overwhelm the enemy with buzzwords 

 

https://www.youtube....h?v=0wX4GODCDEM


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#138 Josh

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Posted 03 June 2020 - 2254 PM

This entire effort to stay relevant is stupid and pointless. There is no reason to defend marine landing units with air cover if that air cover could be actively engaging enemy aircraft or positions elsewhere. On top of that, no USMC unit could hope to land a force that had the range, effectiveness, or magazine capacity of a pair of B-1 bombers with AGM-158C. The only thing I would support is the USMC funneling as much money as possible into a version of the PrSM with an anti ship capability, as that slots right into their existing HIMARS. Anything more than that is a hopeless attempt to stay relevant in a Pacific environment that doesn't require amphibious landings, and thus means the USMC has little to no role to play in that entire theater. Let us a learn from the AVVV and MV-22 and the knee capping of the F-35B and cut the Marines off. If they can't make due with old weapons like they used to, then they no longer server a purpose. If they want to get rid of their tanks; let 'em. I doubt they've fired a shot in anger sine '91.


Edited by Josh, 03 June 2020 - 2255 PM.

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#139 Burncycle360

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Posted 04 June 2020 - 0101 AM

This entire effort to stay relevant is stupid and pointless. There is no reason to defend marine landing units with air cover if that air cover could be actively engaging enemy aircraft or positions elsewhere. On top of that, no USMC unit could hope to land a force that had the range, effectiveness, or magazine capacity of a pair of B-1 bombers with AGM-158C. The only thing I would support is the USMC funneling as much money as possible into a version of the PrSM with an anti ship capability, as that slots right into their existing HIMARS. Anything more than that is a hopeless attempt to stay relevant in a Pacific environment that doesn't require amphibious landings, and thus means the USMC has little to no role to play in that entire theater. Let us a learn from the AVVV and MV-22 and the knee capping of the F-35B and cut the Marines off. If they can't make due with old weapons like they used to, then they no longer server a purpose. If they want to get rid of their tanks; let 'em. I doubt they've fired a shot in anger sine '91.


The Marines are fine, and all the United States requires for our expeditionary warfare needs.  It's the Army that doesn't have a purpose, other than serving as a jobs program and deterring war with Russia or China (which would inevitably go nuclear anyway).


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#140 Josh

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Posted 04 June 2020 - 0215 AM

 

This entire effort to stay relevant is stupid and pointless. There is no reason to defend marine landing units with air cover if that air cover could be actively engaging enemy aircraft or positions elsewhere. On top of that, no USMC unit could hope to land a force that had the range, effectiveness, or magazine capacity of a pair of B-1 bombers with AGM-158C. The only thing I would support is the USMC funneling as much money as possible into a version of the PrSM with an anti ship capability, as that slots right into their existing HIMARS. Anything more than that is a hopeless attempt to stay relevant in a Pacific environment that doesn't require amphibious landings, and thus means the USMC has little to no role to play in that entire theater. Let us a learn from the AVVV and MV-22 and the knee capping of the F-35B and cut the Marines off. If they can't make due with old weapons like they used to, then they no longer server a purpose. If they want to get rid of their tanks; let 'em. I doubt they've fired a shot in anger sine '91.

The Marines are fine, and all the United States requires for our expeditionary warfare needs.  It's the Army that doesn't have a purpose, other than serving as a jobs program and deterring war with Russia or China (which would inevitably go nuclear anyway).

 

 

Unless Russia goes away, I think the Army has a place. And if the USMC wants to play in that space too, fine. 

 

The concept of Marines restructuring themselves to set up ineffectual fire bases in the Pacific is damn stupid, however. By all means, talk it out and prove me wrong.


Edited by Josh, 04 June 2020 - 0216 AM.

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