A: Strategy = taking something valuable to the enemy. Like Hitler would give a rat's ass about Albania. He wouldn't have had to even reinforce, there was no infrastructure to sustain an offensive in Albania.
What is the purpose of all this? "Meet up with Tito?"Why? To collide with the Soviet advance on the East Front?
Strategy and grand strategy. The goal of strategy was to push into Austria. With an allied force in the Balkans Hitler would have to decide whether to send divisions to Italy or to Yugoslavia. Or even if he could deploy as many divisions to the eastern front. He could not do all of those deployments. Whichever he chooses would result in fewer somewhere else. That someplace else is where the allied force pushes through.
Grand strategy was about being able to dictate to Stalin and avoid the debacle of Yalta. The goal here was to liberate Poland. That was probably out of reach. Ivan would have gotten there first. But certainly Hungary and probably Czechoslovakia was reachable.
B: The goal in 1943 was to beat Germany, not dictate to Stalin. Yalta was far away both in time and attitude. You are really grappling with hindsight here.
NO, they did not. CBs built temporary bases, someplace to collect stuff. A port is someplace sheltered where you can unload large ships full of heavy equipment quickly. Ports need wharves and large cranes. The reason the Axis was always strapped logistically in the Western Desert was that Tripoli could not not handle enough shipping to sustain the Axis forces. The Italians shipped in little convoys because three ships at a time was all Tripoli's facilities could handle, and Tripoli's cranes were not large enough for really heavy loads. That is why the Allies met Tiger tanks in Tunisia instead of Libya - Tunis was the only port in the theater that could unload Tigers.
"Building a port at Vlore" in 1943 would have been much more difficult than the MULBERRIES at Normandy.
Not quite that difficult. CBs built ports all over the Pacific in the same fashion.
Uh... just WHO had Mountain divisions in 1943? The US and CW certainly didn't.
And supplying an army in Albania by air was not on in 1943, there simply weren't enough transport assets.
Not an entire field army that would be 500,000 men. Initially a toe hold would be made with only two divisions of mountain and elite infantry.
They would? They never were in the past. Why would they start in 1943?
That could be supplied with air transport. The locals would friendly and helpfull.
A: How did Bordeaux get into the picture?
To delay going to France?
No delay. If as you claim the allies can push 6 division up beaches then 2 would go to Albania 3 to Bordeaux and 1 held in reserve in the Med for use in Italy or Albania as the situation presents itself.
The AXIS forces in Albania were largely poor quality and overextended even for anti-partisan operations.They would have been unable to drive 2 US divisions into the Adriatic. After several weeks the ports would have been built and divisions would start deploying.
B: "After several weeks." Aside from the fact that building a port and roads would take longer than 'several weeks,' you are getting into winter after that time. Fighting in winter in Italy was bad enough, the Balkans would have been much worse.
C: Two US divisions" Send me whatever you are ingesting that makes you think the US JCS would countenance sending US units to Albania. They were PO'd enough about going to Italy.
Going to Albania just makes no sense. There is nothing there that would make it vital in a global war and the effort of getting anywhere vital from Albania is nowhere near commensurate to any reasonable objective.
Go to France and you have nice campaigning country with a transport infrastructure in place, even if we had shot it up a bit, and/or the Germans demo'ed it. Repairing damaged infrastructure is a lot quicker and easier than building it from scratch, as would have to be done in Albania.