Rich Fall ANTON took two days of planning and was executed in a single day when French resistance in North Africa collapsed. German forces reached the Mediterranean coast of France and the Italian 4th Army occupied the Riviera, by nightfall on 11 November. 4th Army began its movement at 2155 10 November.
The landing in Southern France has to be simultaneous to the others, not after them. The Allies landed in Africa on the 8th, so both historical reactions – the Italian 4th Army and Anton - would have been too little, too late. The Italians are not sweeping aside a US Marine Corps in a meeting engagement. By the time the Germans have even got past Lyon without an ‘s’, the Allies are already in possession of Toulon and Marsailles intact. Game over.
Then look. The three corps and nine division of the Italian 4th Army were mostly disposed along the demilitarized zone from the coast to the Swiss border. I CA with 104 Auto.Div.”Mantova” and 105 Auto.Div.”Rovigo”,\ was furthest north and led with the 20 Alpini Sciatori (Alpine skiers), occupying Savoy to the Hautes-Alpes, mainly through the valleys of the Modane and Bourg St-Maurice. XXII CA with 2 Celere Div.”E.F.T.d’Ferro”, 103 Auto.Div.”Piacenza”, 48 (Ital) Inf.Div.”Taro”, and 5 Alp.Div.”Pusteria” was in the center and occupied the Basses-Alpes and upper Alpes-Maritimes. XII CA with 10 Auto.Div.”Piave”, 7 Inf.Div.”Lupi di Tosccana”, and 58 Inf.Div.”Legnano” occupied the coast.
Fantastic information! Thank you. So, given the known poor quality of Italian troop formations, my first blush at that list is the OOB is planning requirement for the invasion of Southern France should be not less than something around 6 divisions ashore in the first 24 hours including all Marine divisions. But that’s just first blush.
More magical thinking.
Bullshit. Energetic and wide spectrum activities to mislead the enemy were a core principle of amphibious warfare doctrine because they often succeeded. You know that. You went all in against Supertorch instantly, reflexively. And now that you’ve planted your flag on that hill, you have to resort to nonsense claims such as that diversionary methods fundamental to amphibious warfare technique are “magic”.
In other words, you don't know and are too lazy to find out, since this is yet another one of your trolling exercises.
The specific reason why I haven’t researched German army dispositions in France in 1943 is that my research library,
Is closed on weekends during the summer. I work full time. Won’t be until September unless I take some days off, but when I do that, I got on vacation. Once September comes I can dig in.
. 15. AOK was NOT IN Normandy. Try getting simple facts straight before you begin bloviating.
Sorry, 7th Army in Normandy. When I post quickly I can sometimes do things like say east for west, or 7th for 15th. Or Lyons with an ‘s’.
You have zero idea what Axis forces actually deployed to occupy Southern France, so you have zero idea what the condition of beach defenses or local reserves would be. Try getting simple facts straight before you begin bloviating.
I know that the German army had no beach defenses in Southern France at the point Torch landed and I can’t think of one major amphibious landing in WW2 that was defeated by an army approaching the landing zone on the march.
Axis forces did not occupy Vichy France by rail and German forces did not initially occupy Toulon.
The Germans occupied Toulon without significant fighting. Therefor, so too could have the Allies. If the Allies get these ports largely undamaged, and hold them, the Battle of France is already decided. The idea that the Germans could retake these ports in a prepared counterattack later without rail communications to nearby is completely infeasible.
British 8th Army was subject to the same real-world logistical limitations as Rommel.
The British 8th Army in late 1942 had far better means in every category imaginable than Rommel. More airpower. More trucks and mechanization. More sea logistics. Better ports. More engineering and construction support. Rommel’s supplies in contrast were drying up. The Axis had enough shipping to intervene in Tunisia, but once that happened, they had little to spare for Libya.
That would certainly help, given you have demonstrated zero knowledge of the actual force structure and have instead substituted magical thinking as your panacea.
Hey speaking of the bloviating thing, I noticed you didn’t state that you think Anton could have thrown a major Allied landing in Southern France into the sea straight off a road march. While remaining silent on Anton, you did, however, list in detail the OOB for the Italian 4th Army. Do you think Anton can throw a major invasion into the sea off the march? Yes or no?