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Philippines

December 1941

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#1 Rick

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Posted 31 August 2019 - 0533 AM

From various readings it appears the U.S. commanders, shall we say, make mistakes. If said mistakes did not happen, was the Japanese conquest still inevitable?


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#2 R011

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Posted 31 August 2019 - 0944 AM

As the Americans didn't seem to have been able to supply and reinforce while the Japanese could, their chances were not good.
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#3 Burncycle360

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Posted 31 August 2019 - 2011 PM

I believe the US could have made the Philippines a quagmire for the Japanese such that they would remain tied up there for significantly longer, possibly the duration of the war, but that would have required a change in strategic planning, doctrine, and amount of resources dedicated to the task.


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#4 Nobu

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Posted 01 September 2019 - 1334 PM

With Colonel Tsuji arriving at 14th Corps headquarters in Manila on April 1, the question becomes one of whether the Filipino people and their American garrison would be able to withstand the kind of reprisals he would undoubtedly have advocated in response to a drawn-out campaign of attrition.


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#5 Markus Becker

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Posted 03 September 2019 - 0420 AM

From various readings it appears the U.S. commanders, shall we say, make mistakes. If said mistakes did not happen, was the Japanese conquest still inevitable?


Not if the Philippine army had been mobilized in the summer of 1940 along with the rest of the US forces* like Mac Arthur and President Quezon wanted to.

*I know. Legally they weren't exactly a part of the US military but do facto they were.
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#6 Rick

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Posted 03 September 2019 - 0446 AM

 

From various readings it appears the U.S. commanders, shall we say, make mistakes. If said mistakes did not happen, was the Japanese conquest still inevitable?


Not if the Philippine army had been mobilized in the summer of 1940 along with the rest of the US forces* like Mac Arthur and President Quezon wanted to.

*I know. Legally they weren't exactly a part of the US military but do facto they were.

 

Did not know this. Sources I can read up about it?


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#7 Markus Becker

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Posted 03 September 2019 - 0601 AM

I'm not sure if it is in the paper "Defence of the Philippines" on the website hyperwar or in the book "Racing the Sunrise". The latter is not just about the last minute efforts to reinforce the far east but also has information on what Mac had been doing in the years before. Which was quite a bit considering how little money he had to work with.
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#8 Nobu

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Posted 03 September 2019 - 2044 PM

A more thorough mobilization of raw, untried Filipino manpower will have the benefit of diluting the cadre of regulars needed to prevent their collapse on first contact with battle-hardened Japanese infantry, and the available pool of White American officers available to lead them.

Command planning for the handling of POWs in this theater was already inadequate.
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#9 Rich

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Posted 03 September 2019 - 2248 PM

 

From various readings it appears the U.S. commanders, shall we say, make mistakes. If said mistakes did not happen, was the Japanese conquest still inevitable?


Not if the Philippine army had been mobilized in the summer of 1940 along with the rest of the US forces* like Mac Arthur and President Quezon wanted to.

*I know. Legally they weren't exactly a part of the US military but do facto they were.

 

 

Um, no, the plan to mobilize the Philippines armed forces followed the recall of MacArthur into service and his appointment as Commander of USAFFE on 26 July 1941. The date selected to begin mobilization was 1 September 1941.

 

The mobilization of US Army forces began on 8 September 1939, continued through fall 1940 when the first National Guard units were federalized, and continued into 1941. However, much of the mobilization was in terms of filling up manpower slots in existing organizations - bringing the 13 existing RA divisions (1st-9th, 1st and 2d Cav, Hawaiian, and Philippine) up to strength and organizing the first two armored divisions. By July 1941, the Army consisted of 35 divisions, 1st and 2nd Cavalry, the 1st-9th, 26th-38th, and 40th, 41st, and 43rd-45th Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Division, Philippine Division, and the 1st-4th Armored Divisions, nearly all the growth fueled by the National Guard.


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#10 Markus Becker

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Posted 04 September 2019 - 0205 AM

A more thorough mobilization of raw, untried Filipino manpower will have the benefit of diluting the cadre of regulars needed to prevent their collapse on first contact with battle-hardened Japanese infantry, and the available pool of White American officers available to lead them.

Command planning for the handling of POWs in this theater was already inadequate.


Almost correct, except for the fact that after one and a half years the soldiers of the PI army would no longer be raw and untrained. And probably not as badly armed either.
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#11 Markus Becker

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Posted 04 September 2019 - 0209 AM

Um, no, the plan to mobilize the Philippines armed forces followed the recall of MacArthur into service and his appointment as Commander of USAFFE on 26 July 1941. The date selected to begin mobilization was 1 September 1941.


Yes but Mac and Quezon would have liked this to happen mid 1940 already but the Philippines couldn't cover the cost and the USA wouldn't. Thus their army went into battle with many battalions of men having never even fired the rifles on a shooting range.
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#12 Rick

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Posted 04 September 2019 - 0614 AM

 

 

From various readings it appears the U.S. commanders, shall we say, make mistakes. If said mistakes did not happen, was the Japanese conquest still inevitable?


Not if the Philippine army had been mobilized in the summer of 1940 along with the rest of the US forces* like Mac Arthur and President Quezon wanted to.

*I know. Legally they weren't exactly a part of the US military but do facto they were.

 

 

Um, no, the plan to mobilize the Philippines armed forces followed the recall of MacArthur into service and his appointment as Commander of USAFFE on 26 July 1941. The date selected to begin mobilization was 1 September 1941.

 

The mobilization of US Army forces began on 8 September 1939, continued through fall 1940 when the first National Guard units were federalized, and continued into 1941. However, much of the mobilization was in terms of filling up manpower slots in existing organizations - bringing the 13 existing RA divisions (1st-9th, 1st and 2d Cav, Hawaiian, and Philippine) up to strength and organizing the first two armored divisions. By July 1941, the Army consisted of 35 divisions, 1st and 2nd Cavalry, the 1st-9th, 26th-38th, and 40th, 41st, and 43rd-45th Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Division, Philippine Division, and the 1st-4th Armored Divisions, nearly all the growth fueled by the National Guard.

 

Rich, as far as you know, did the U.S.A.A.F. have a plan to use the B17's in the Philippines to bomb the Japanese airfields in Formosa? IMO, if they did, it probably wouldn't do much good with only 30+ bombers. Thoughts?

 
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#13 Nobu

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Posted 04 September 2019 - 1427 PM

I doubt USAAF intelligence was well informed enough to pinpoint which of the many airfields on Formosa should be targeted for effect by its unescorted bombers in daylight. If it was, such intelligence would have forewarned the headquarters it reported to in other ways.


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#14 Nobu

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Posted 04 September 2019 - 1438 PM

 

A more thorough mobilization of raw, untried Filipino manpower will have the benefit of diluting the cadre of regulars needed to prevent their collapse on first contact with battle-hardened Japanese infantry, and the available pool of White American officers available to lead them.

Command planning for the handling of POWs in this theater was already inadequate.


Almost correct, except for the fact that after one and a half years the soldiers of the PI army would no longer be raw and untrained. And probably not as badly armed either.

 

 

There is the question of how motivated non-regular Filipino conscripts, impressed into units for an unspecified number of years and commanded by a finite pool of White American officers, would ever be to fight on behalf of their colonial masters.

 

The answer would be given by their performance on first contact with the Japanese regulars of the 48th Motorized and 16th Infantry divisions.

 

The quality of what they might be armed with could probably be determined by the weapons discarded by retreating masses of such Filipinos on their retreat routes soon afterward.


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#15 Markus Becker

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Posted 05 September 2019 - 0740 AM

You keep getting the most basic facts wrong.

 

By 1941 the Philippines were one step away from full independance. That was probably the reason why the Filipino soliders struggled so hard against their new wanna be colonial master from Japan. Who they fought for half a year. Much longer than the invaders expected and that was despite their very severe shortage of training. 

 

It is very hard to image they could have done anything but better had they had the opportunity to begin training much earlier. 


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#16 Nobu

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Posted 05 September 2019 - 1134 AM

It is interesting how news of a gathering Union Army could potentially motivate plantation owners to improve the conditions of those toiling under them.

 

If I am not mistaken, with the fighting for his homeland still raging, Quezon appealed to Roosevelt for full Filipino independence and permission to demobilize the Philippine Army (presumably in the field) as preliminaries to suing for a separate peace.

 

That was probably the reason why the Filipino soliders struggled so hard against their new wanna be colonial master from Japan.

 

American and Filipino exhortations to fight to the last man and last bullet aside, which apparently the president of the Philippines Commonwealth himself had no faith in, 63,000 Filipino POWs taken by an IJA force that was never greater than 9 battalions for most of the campaign paints a somewhat different picture.


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