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#781 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 25 May 2019 - 1141 AM

If aircraft carriers are useless, why do so many people want them?


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#782 Harold Jones

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Posted 25 May 2019 - 1825 PM

I don't think they are useless, but there is a certain cargo cult mystique to them.  Having an aircraft carrier really doesn't buy you much vs a peer or near peer opponent.  Having a couple is better, unless you don't have the resources to put them both to sea with a full compliment of planes and escorts then you might as well have one or none.   


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#783 Colin

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Posted 25 May 2019 - 2013 PM

The purpose of two is to ensure you always have 1 ready to go. Ships need regular refits and the UK still has oversea commitments and territories. The concept of having other nations fly off the decks as well is a good idea.


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#784 Chris Werb

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Posted 25 May 2019 - 2119 PM

If aircraft carriers are useless, why do so many people want them?

 

Because they're useful in many circumstances and because they are indicators of national prestige. The circumstances in which they are useful (as Swerve pointed out) do not include a peer-peer conflict, for example vs Russia which is now meant to be our primary focus.


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#785 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 26 May 2019 - 0235 AM

 

If aircraft carriers are useless, why do so many people want them?

 

Because they're useful in many circumstances and because they are indicators of national prestige. The circumstances in which they are useful (as Swerve pointed out) do not include a peer-peer conflict, for example vs Russia which is now meant to be our primary focus.

 

 

But why wouldnt they be useful in a peer to peer conflict? We keep kicking this around. Russia does NOT have the armed forces it had in 1990. Their ability to deliver anti ship missiles via air is significantly less than then, and I can think of only 2 submarines in the entire Russian navy anywhere near as good as an Astute.

 

There was an incident in 1983 when the US Navy managed to operate off Kamchatka for several days in complete radio silence. The Soviets only realised they were there when a squadron of F14's accidentally overflew one of the Kuriles.

 

https://en.wikipedia...i/FleetEx_'83-1

 

https://digitalschol...esdissertations

As the exercise approached its conclusion, the USS Midway performed a particularly intimidating maneuver. All electronic emissions were shut off, and the ship sailed quietly toward the Kurile Islands. Without an electronic signal to track, the only way the Soviets could have known its location would be by direct visible observation, which they did not have. When the Midway reappeared southeast of Kamchatka, the Soviets were ―clearly surprised.‖ On April 4, the exercise escalated again when at least six U.S. Navy aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles.78The particular island in question, known as Zelyoni to the Soviets and Habomai-Shoto to the Japanese, is only about ten square miles and is the largest of a set of islands called the Habomai Rocks, within twenty miles of Japanese territory (see Figure 1: ―Japan-USSR: Northern Territories‖). There was virtually nothing on the island except a small Red Army outpost. The Soviets were outraged, and ordered a retaliatory overflight of U.S. territory in the Aleutian Islands. The Soviet Union also issued a demarche, a formal diplomatic note of protest, which accused the United States of repeated penetrations of Soviet airspace.

 

https://www.cia.gov/...drum/source.htm

In the August-September 1981 exercise, an armada of 83 US, British, Canadian, and Norwegian ships led by the carrier Eisenhower managed to transit the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap undetected, using a variety of carefully crafted and previously rehearsed concealment and deception measures.27 A combination of passive measures (maintaining radio silence and operating under emissions control conditions) and active measures (radar-jamming and transmission of false radar signals) turned the allied force into something resembling a stealth fleet, which even managed to elude a Soviet low-orbit, active-radar satellite launched to locate it.28 As the warships came within operating areas of Soviet long-range reconnaissance planes, the Soviets were initially able to identify but not track them. Meanwhile, Navy fighters conducted an unprecedented simulated attack on the Soviet planes as they refueled in-flight, flying at low levels to avoid detection by Soviet shore-based radar sites.29

In the second phase of this exercise, a cruiser and three other ships left the carrier battle group and sailed north through the Norwegian Sea and then east around Norway's Cape North and into the Barents Sea. They then sailed near the militarily important Kola Peninsula and remained there for nine days before rejoining the main group.

In April-May 1983, the US Pacific Fleet held its largest exercises to date in the northwest Pacific.30 Forty ships, including three aircraft carrier battle groups, participated along with AWACS-equipped B-52s. At one point the fleet sailed within 720 kilometers (450 miles) of the Kamchatka Peninsula and Petropavlovsk, the only Soviet naval base with direct access to open seas. US attack submarines and antisubmarine aircraft conducted operations in protected areas ("bastions") where the Soviet Navy had stationed a large number of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). US Navy aircraft from the carriers Midway and Enterprise carried out a simulated bombing run over a military installation on the small Soviet-occupied island of Zelenny in the Kuril Island chain.31

 

In addition to these exercises, according to published accounts, the Navy applied a full-court press against the Soviets in various forward areas. Warships began operating in the Baltic and Black Seas and routinely sailed past Cape North and into the Barents Sea. Intelligence ships were positioned off the Crimean coast. Aircraft carriers with submarine escorts were anchored in Norwegian fjords. US attack submarines practiced assaults on Soviet SSBNs stationed beneath the polar ice cap.

These US demonstrations of military might were aimed at deterring the Soviets from provocative actions and at displaying US determination to respond in kind to Soviet regional and global exercises that had become larger, more sophisticated, and more menacing in preceding years. The projection of naval and naval air power exposed gaping holes in Soviet ocean surveillance and early warning systems. For example, in a Congressional briefing on the 1983 Pacific exercise, the chief of naval operations noted that the Soviets "are as naked as a jaybird there [on the Kamchatka Peninsula], and they know it."32 His comment applied equally to the far northern maritime area and the Kola Peninsula. In short, the Navy had demonstrated that it could:

  • Elude the USSR's large and complex ocean surveillance systems.33
  • Defeat Soviet tactical warning systems.
  • Penetrate air defense systems.

 

 

So the question im asking myself is this. If we could do that in 1983 when the Soviet Air Force and Navy was at its near height, then why is today any different? What remarkable capabilities does the Russian Navy have compared to 1983? Today Its a brown water navy, a capable one Id be the first to admit, but the ability to operate on the high seas is non existent. They have at best upgraded 13 May maritime recce aircraft (I think Syria shot one down) And as for the Bears, they seem to be increasingly difficult to keep operating. They have barely 66 Backfire bombers, and they dont practice maritime strike as half as much as they did in the 1980's. They seem to be utilized as conventional land attack aircraft these days.

 

China, well I grant you there is an upswing in their capabilities. But if the USN feels that it needs 12 carriers and they remain viable in the West Pacific, im going to believe them. Its hardly as if we would operate there in isolation.

 

As for the prestige, spot on. And on top of the above reason's, thats why ive come around from being darkly cynical about them, to singing their praises. We need them for a feeling of political well being, and a statement of intent we will invest in the navy. And that's on top of their strategic utility in having several hundred square feet of UK PLC we can move anywhere around the world. That kind of capability is always going to have a utility, either as a Carrier, or any other power projection platform. I find it interesting, its ONLY the counties that dont have significant carrier forces that continually mock them. I find that telling.


Edited by Stuart Galbraith, 26 May 2019 - 0257 AM.

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#786 Chris Werb

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Posted 26 May 2019 - 0636 AM

 

 

If aircraft carriers are useless, why do so many people want them?

 

Because they're useful in many circumstances and because they are indicators of national prestige. The circumstances in which they are useful (as Swerve pointed out) do not include a peer-peer conflict, for example vs Russia which is now meant to be our primary focus.

 

 

But why wouldnt they be useful in a peer to peer conflict?

 

 

How many times have we been over this?

 

Vs Russia CVs are a stupidly expensive and vulnerable way of basing a tiny number of tactical aircraft in not very useful places. Just to have one in place, you have to have the carrier, at least two destroyers, at least two and more likely three or four frigates and probably an SSN, plus whatever RFAs need to be there to replenish the group, plus they have to be escorted whilst they traipse back and forth. That is an awful lot of resources and scarce defence pounds.

 

In order to attack Russia, or provide any worthwhile support, where would a carrier have to be?  It can't hide in the wide expanses of the Pacific to attack Murmansk. Don't even get me started on parking one in the North Sea - let alone the Baltic.  As for its location, the carrier would have been shadowed right up to the outbreak of conflict.  If it's still in port, it's dead within minutes of a conflict breaking out. They wouldn't need cruise missiles. Someone landed a civilian drone on the deck of this thing FFS!

 

Let's say the thing survives, then what. It's only offensive capability is what? A dozen short-legged F-35Bs* which could have been much more survivably and flexibly based, much closer to where they were needed, without a carrier and of which there would have been many more without a carrier. Other than that, and potentially getting 1600 servicemen/women killed quite easily, the carrier is a terrific idea.

 

I can give you a bunch of scenarios where a carrier would be a terrific (but sometimes not the best) thing to have, but the question is do those scenarios justify our having a couple of them?

 

*Assuming half were providing air defence for the carrier itself.


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#787 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 27 May 2019 - 0226 AM

 

 

 

If aircraft carriers are useless, why do so many people want them?

 

Because they're useful in many circumstances and because they are indicators of national prestige. The circumstances in which they are useful (as Swerve pointed out) do not include a peer-peer conflict, for example vs Russia which is now meant to be our primary focus.

 

 

But why wouldnt they be useful in a peer to peer conflict?

 

 

How many times have we been over this?

 

Vs Russia CVs are a stupidly expensive and vulnerable way of basing a tiny number of tactical aircraft in not very useful places. Just to have one in place, you have to have the carrier, at least two destroyers, at least two and more likely three or four frigates and probably an SSN, plus whatever RFAs need to be there to replenish the group, plus they have to be escorted whilst they traipse back and forth. That is an awful lot of resources and scarce defence pounds.

 

In order to attack Russia, or provide any worthwhile support, where would a carrier have to be?  It can't hide in the wide expanses of the Pacific to attack Murmansk. Don't even get me started on parking one in the North Sea - let alone the Baltic.  As for its location, the carrier would have been shadowed right up to the outbreak of conflict.  If it's still in port, it's dead within minutes of a conflict breaking out. They wouldn't need cruise missiles. Someone landed a civilian drone on the deck of this thing FFS!

 

Let's say the thing survives, then what. It's only offensive capability is what? A dozen short-legged F-35Bs* which could have been much more survivably and flexibly based, much closer to where they were needed, without a carrier and of which there would have been many more without a carrier. Other than that, and potentially getting 1600 servicemen/women killed quite easily, the carrier is a terrific idea.

 

I can give you a bunch of scenarios where a carrier would be a terrific (but sometimes not the best) thing to have, but the question is do those scenarios justify our having a couple of them?

 

*Assuming half were providing air defence for the carrier itself.

 

 

Tot up how much you need to have a functional airbase in a peer conflict. You would need to have an air defence battery, you need ot have a CAP at all times, you need EOD personnel, you need engineer equipment to fill all the bomb craters, and last not least, you need Air Force Securitys staff all round the airbase to keep the gomers getting in. Look at any Airbase in Afghanistan. Are we REALLY saying that was cheaper to keep operational than a carrier in the gulf and a tanker to ferry aircraft in? Because I dont personally believe it. It sure as hell is more secure against terrorists, and unlike a runway, it can move, which means its a lot more secure against ballistic weapons. Even simple weapons like Scud can present a threat to land based airpower.

 

I repeat, how do you detect one in the North cape when they couldnt even do it in the 1980's, when they had the Walker Spy ring to help them? Personally, if we are talking about long range strike, I think removing Stormshadow from F35B was a stupid costcutting. One that I feel sure will be reversed because it is so self evidently a stupid idea. That isnt the fault of the carrier, thats the fault of MOD accountants, and it could be reversed a lot easier than just removing the Carrier.

 

So lets look at the range. F35B has an unrefuelled combat radius of 505 nautical miles. I suspect if we commit to not entering Russian airspace, then you can carry 2 wing tanks. But lets leave it at that.

 

If you fit Stormshadow you have the ability to hit any target in 800 nm of the middle of the Barents sea.  Which would make it capable of hitting Murmansk and even as far south as St Petersburg. I submit this is not a threat the Russians would take lightly.

 

If the Americans integrate JASSM ER with F35B then you have,

 

505 NM + 575nm. Which is enough to reach as far south as Moscow. It would be even further if we adopt buddy refuelling. Or, again, have a semi stealthy configuraton. A risk because I suspect you would have to partly overfly land, but it would hardly going to be worse off than a Superhornet in that situaton however.

 

With some small investment (or hey, just take the yanks along to do all the work) it would be  a capable strike platform. That is, If we go a little further and invest in it, and stop accepting the hysterical statements about Russian hypersonic weapons, because I for one dont believe them. If they were as successful as they say, I doubt they would be jailing half the Dev team.

https://pressfrom.in...developers.html

 

The question is not, should we have a carrier or not. That question has been decided. The question should be how do we use it when the fur starts to fly. Would I chose to procure 2 of them as we are now? No. Id buy more tanks. But im not one to throw away useful kit suddenly because its out of fashion. That really is MTV generation defence procurement, and we really with such an impoverished nation must stop doing it.


Edited by Stuart Galbraith, 27 May 2019 - 0228 AM.

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#788 rmgill

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Posted 28 May 2019 - 0848 AM

Here is the thing. We have ships that travel all over the world with  increasingly small crews. Its even possible today to command ships via remote control. In some parts of norway they are already doing it via ferries. Its increasingly ridiculous to not condede that automation inevitably has a role in warships, as it gets more and more costly to build these leviathans.


What's it cost to have a ship that's lost because of an engineering casualty and not enough folks to fix it?

 

Whilst a carrier is a far, far more complicated machine, it does seem a strange argument you need 4000 crew to stop a carrier under attack sinking. To have a realistic effort to kill a 100000 supercarrier, you are going to have to hit it with a tactical nuke, or with enough conventional weapons to turn it into a cullinder. In either of those circumstances the chances of saving a carrier from extensive battle damage is remote. The example of the Forrestal and the Oriskany is interesting, but how common is that? Its not as if the QE's dont incorporate a lot of new equipment to deal with flight deck fires.


Shit happens. You need people able to deal with that shit. 

420897_532845073466_142500611_30735670_1

 kf670729-02.gif


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#789 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 28 May 2019 - 0915 AM

 

Here is the thing. We have ships that travel all over the world with  increasingly small crews. Its even possible today to command ships via remote control. In some parts of norway they are already doing it via ferries. Its increasingly ridiculous to not condede that automation inevitably has a role in warships, as it gets more and more costly to build these leviathans.


What's it cost to have a ship that's lost because of an engineering casualty and not enough folks to fix it?

 

Whilst a carrier is a far, far more complicated machine, it does seem a strange argument you need 4000 crew to stop a carrier under attack sinking. To have a realistic effort to kill a 100000 supercarrier, you are going to have to hit it with a tactical nuke, or with enough conventional weapons to turn it into a cullinder. In either of those circumstances the chances of saving a carrier from extensive battle damage is remote. The example of the Forrestal and the Oriskany is interesting, but how common is that? Its not as if the QE's dont incorporate a lot of new equipment to deal with flight deck fires.


Shit happens. You need people able to deal with that shit. 

420897_532845073466_142500611_30735670_1

 kf670729-02.gif

 

 

 

Yes, but this is the Royal Navy, with more postwar combat experience at sea than all the others combined. HMS Sheffield, Coventry, Antelope and several others were all lost, not because they had small crews. But in spite of having adequate crews for their size they still sank, because they were overwhelmed by the damage fairly quickly, before those  crews could be brought to bear on the problem. OK, in fairness, they saved Sheffield. But she still sank under tow. The RN was so struck by the experience, they invested in this. These are people fully aware of the problem.

 

 

 

In the end, QE still got a ships crew of 700 people. If 700 people cant figure out the solution to a problem quickly enough to matter, then im not getting the logic that 4000 people are going to work any better This is very old thinking based on the idea that more ships crew was better. Well, we did that with HMS Blake and HMS Tiger, and ended up with ships so expensive to run we couldn't keep them in service.

Its not big crews that are the solution. Its well trained, smart crews.

 

Im more struck by the argument earlier, that when the ships are in service for some time, we will have to keep repairing them, and that all the mechanization will ensure they will be difficult to keep serviceable with such a small crew. That may be true, but we shall have to see.  I would say the Invincibles had 650 crew, and they had no problem keeping them operational. And she had just as many engines and lifts as her bigger offspring.


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#790 bojan

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Posted 28 May 2019 - 1245 PM

At least one (forgot which one, it has been a while) was lost because of the utterly shitty damage control.

USS Stark had similar extent of damage (if not worst), and all the same problems in dealing with it, but a good DC prevailed.

 

Also, it is not how many people you have total, it is how many you can allocate to fixing a ship-threatening problem.


Edited by bojan, 28 May 2019 - 1247 PM.

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#791 Chris Werb

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Posted 28 May 2019 - 1704 PM

Stuart, you're not reading what I'm posting. You don't have to detect a carrier that you're already shadowing.

 

So you integrate JASSM with F-35 to achieve range (although you'll only be able to afford a limited number thereof due to the money you wasted on the carrier). Why does a JASSM equipped aircraft have to operate from a carrier? If it's F-35B, why does it have to operate from an airfield?  In most likely European scenarios, why does JASSM need to be launched from an aircraft at all?

 

As to defending airfields, what is more costly - a terrestrial SAM battery or a Destroyer? What is cheaper against surface threats - an infantry company or a frigate?

 

Also, it has been demonstrated that carriers are perfectly capable of suffering massive damage and being out of combat for many months if not years through simple accidents. You don't have to hit a carrier with a tactical nuke to put it out of action. A rogue 5 inch rocket managed it on one occasion. I'd like to know how many airfields were out of action by a single 5 inch rocket, or sank for that matter. Remember that a carrier also doesn't have to sink or be a total loss to be a waste of investment in a conventional conflict. It just has to lose the ability to launch and recover fixed wing aircraft. 


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#792 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 0152 AM

Chris, in the end we have 2 carriers. You believe they are no use to our present defence strategy. Im saying that for a moderate investment they certainly could be.

 

Its not about whether this was the right defence procurement for now or not. Its a case of using the force we have the best way we can. In 1956 we were using nuclear bombers at conventional strike platforms. In the Falklands, we were using Nuclear Powered Attack boats, designed to sink the Soviet Navy, to sink a 40 year old cruiser. Nobody said ' we have the wrong defence posture, we must rethink this', we basically said 'we have this defence posture, how can we use it to advantage'.

 

Why is this any different? I repeat, I would not choose to buy these now, I was quite happy with the invincibles. That we DO happen to own 130000 thousand square feet of British real estate we can move around the globe, lets figure out a way we can use them to advantage, rather than lament its the wrong colour.

 

We will continue to disagree on this, and thats fine. Thats what tanknet is for.


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#793 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 0201 AM

At least one (forgot which one, it has been a while) was lost because of the utterly shitty damage control.

USS Stark had similar extent of damage (if not worst), and all the same problems in dealing with it, but a good DC prevailed.

 

Also, it is not how many people you have total, it is how many you can allocate to fixing a ship-threatening problem.

 

Antelope? She was lost when they tried to disarm a 500lb bomb because the EOD team didnt have the correct equipment to do it properly. There was some chaos on the dock in England, and it was not recognised a .50 fuse extracting squib was vital equipment. I think they used a 7.62 one and it didnt fully remove the fuse.

 

The Americans did very well in the Gulf. I gather there was some initial chaos in the response to the missile strike on the Stark, but the crew was well drilled and made it work. I think what was more impressive was the saving off the USS Samuel B Roberts, where the crew seemed to stop the ship breaking its back by lashing the upper deck together with cables.

 

https://en.wikipedia...oberts_(FFG-58)

 

Its tempting to say they learned the lessons of the Falklands war. I would think it probably more likely they learned the lessons of the USS Belknap


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#794 bojan

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 0625 AM

No, one that was hit by Exocet that did not explode but has started a bad fire. Basically the same scenario as faced on Stark - masive rocket propelant fire, lost electricity, lost water pressure in the part of the FF lines.

 

It was a speed by which DC teams were organized, efforts in confining vs fighting fire (USM realized that until all rocket propellant burns out you can not fight it directly and it is better to confine it), way electricity was restored etc. Some of those things might be due the design of the ships, but RN missed a lot of crucial steps and put a lot of effort in the non-crucial ones, losing a ship that could have probably been saved.


Edited by bojan, 29 May 2019 - 0631 AM.

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#795 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 0634 AM

Id not heard that there were damage control deficiencies that ive heard, but its certainly possible. It certainly had damage comparable to the Stark.  As it was, they did in fact save it, it just founded under the bad weather they had in the south atlantic. The stark in that respect was a lot luckier.

 

There was a minor scandal that came out about 10 years after it happened when it was discovered the AWO wasnt even at his post when the missile hit. It turned out there had been so many false warnings of air attacks, he didnt respond to all of them. That was bad enough, but the navy saw fit after the event to promote him to a job at the MOD. There seemed to be be a reluctance in the words of some officers to air dirty laundry in public, after was was on the face of it a successful campaign.


Edited by Stuart Galbraith, 29 May 2019 - 0634 AM.

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#796 Josh

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 0721 AM

IIRC, Shelffield was a burnt out husk. I suspect she'd have been written off if she made it home. That said it is hard to compare the damage from two different incidents, though perhaps with that many survivors it would be quite possible to compare and contrast the DC effort.


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#797 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 0724 AM

IIRC, Shelffield was a burnt out husk. I suspect she'd have been written off if she made it home. That said it is hard to compare the damage from two different incidents, though perhaps with that many survivors it would be quite possible to compare and contrast the DC effort.

 

Probably. Sir Galahad was also similarly damaged (a bomb in her case) so much so they scuttled her as a war grave. Rather difficult to extricate the crew from the remains of the ship by that point.

 

There is a very good account of the Stark attack in 'America's first war with Iran', (despite the wordy title is actually a good read). In Stark, I gather the warhead didnt go off, it was the rocket fuel that did all the damage. There appears to be some contrast to the Sheffield. The MOD report initially stated the warhead did not detonate, something I took as an article of faith till I read this.

 

https://en.wikipedia...Sheffield_(D80)

 

The initial Ministry of Defence (MOD) Board of Inquiry on the sinking of Sheffield concluded that, based upon available evidence, the warhead did not detonate.[17] However, some of the crew and members of the task force believed that the missile's 165 kilograms (364 lb) warhead had detonated.[12] This was supported by a MOD re-assessment of the loss of Sheffield, which reported in summer 2015. In a paper delivered to the RINA Warship Conference in Bath in June 2015, it was concluded that the Exocet warhead did indeed detonate inside Sheffield, with the results supported by analysis using modern damage analysis tools not available in 1982 and evidence from weapon hits and trials conducted since the end of the Falklands campaign.[18]

Regardless, the impact of the missile and the burning rocket motor set Sheffield ablaze. Some accounts suggest that the initial impact of the missile immediately crippled the ship's onboard electricity generating systems, but this only affected certain parts of the ship, which caused ventilation problems. The missile strike also fractured the water main,[19] preventing the anti-fire mechanisms from operating effectively, and thereby dooming the ship to be consumed by the raging fire. The Royal Navy Court of Inquiry suggested the critical factors leading to loss of Sheffield were:

 

  1. Failure to respond to HMS Glasgow's detection and communication of two approaching Super Etendards by immediately going to action stations and launching chaff decoys;[20]
  2. Lack of ECM jamming capability;
  3. Lack of a point defense system;
  4. Inadequate operator training, in particular simulated realistic low-level target acquisition.

Slow response of the available 909 Sea Dart tracking radar and its operator limited the possible response. The spread of the fire was not adequately controlled due to the presence of ignitable material coverings and lack of adequate curtains and sealing to restrict smoke and fires. Captain Salt's handing of the ship during the four hours over which the fires were fought were not faulted, nor was his decision to abandon ship due to the risk of fires igniting the Sea Dart magazine, the exposed position to air attack of HMS Arrow and Yarmouth assisting the firefighting, and fact that the combat capability of the destroyer was irredeemably lost.

 

 

Ive not read that report, but it certainly looks like its worth doing so.

 

There is also this at the end, though as it dates from the time with some incorrect conclusions, im not sure how much its representive of what happened. Its hard to blame the damage control team if the water main had been destroyed by the warhead.

 

 

The official report into the sinking of Sheffield, disclosed in 2006 under UK Freedom of Information laws after an extensive campaign by ex-RN personnel,[17] severely criticised the ship's fire-fighting equipment, training and procedures and certain members of the crew.[27] In 2017, a complete copy of the report was issued, revealing information that according to the Guardian had been "suppressed" from the summary of the board’s findings in the 2006 release. The Guardian explained the missing information by the British Government' s attepts to sell type 42 destroyers at the same time. In the new report, multiple issues that left the ship unprepared for the attack were identified, including findings of negligence by two officers who according to the Guardian "escaped courts martial and did not face disciplinary action, apparently in order to avoid undermining the euphoria that gripped much of the UK at the end of the war". Among other findings, the "uncensored" report showed that the ship was not sufficiently prepared to ward off an attack, during the attack, the anti-air warfare officer had a coffee outside the operations room, his assistant had gone to the restroom. The anti-air officer did not expect the Sheffield to be in the range of attack.[28]


Edited by Stuart Galbraith, 29 May 2019 - 0732 AM.

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#798 rmgill

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 1117 AM

The US experience with the LCS should be a warning. Theres not enough crew to keep up with the engineering issues of the ship on a routine non-combat related deployment. They're going to be hard pressed to save a ship damaged by some sort of combat action if that's the case. 

Bad design can make a damaged ship harder to save from critical damage. ie not enough fire pumps. Not enough fire mains. Damaged communications. 

One of the biggest lessons for me when walking on US WWII era battle ships was seeing the large gauge cables for re routing power feeds damaged by battle. It's easier to provide three phase power to a system that's controlled remotely with some 0000 cable than it is to re-wire the entire network and control it remotely. A system that CANNOT operate under local control is going to be an engineering casualty.  


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#799 Paul Lakowski

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Posted 29 May 2019 - 1749 PM

To dominate any kind of sea you need a diverse groups of warships and air/space search platforms working as a team . SSN/SSGN under the horizon search for surface and sub contacts and liaise through VLF coms to MPA and networked to battle groups. The only way such Battle Groups can successfully survive and function in hostile seas is if they have adequate network /over the horizon passive surveillance from all ships plus AWACS air cover.

 

Some kind of aircraft carrier seems needed....minimum should be those Japanese DDGH [20kt or more].


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#800 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 30 May 2019 - 0154 AM

Drone ships are the new thing. I can certainly see the utility in using things like this as picket ships. A role that lost us a number of vessels in the Falklands Campaign.

https://www.ibtimes....y-darpa-1659339

 

The Royal Navy has also been looking at it, in a minesweeping role.

https://www.express....weeping-uk-news


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