I'm not sure it is either, but either you build fields (or extend Port Stanley's field), or are able to sustain sea communications, or very likely you lose such a campaign. I suppose longer range a/c or lots more aerial tankers could be another angle. Anyway still amazing the Argentine military establishment gave apparently such little thought to basic questions of the concept of such a campaign over such a long time before it.
Apparently after the early euforia of a succesfull landing operation, argie military planners (who as already pointed out would have prefered to launch this campaign, if at all, a few years later on and during spring months, rather than fall), had to make contingency desitions.
The original idea was to have some 2000 to 4000 troops stationed on the islands, while 'aggresive' negotations with the UK took place. As the Task Force set sail for Ascension, this plan was rapidly seen as unsufficient, and army units which where not even prepared to deploy on a weekly exercise where regrouped and flown in by commercial airliner. Aerolineas Argentinas, the former argie flag airline flew some 9000 troops to the islands, the sea route already considered to risky and slow for massive personnel movement during these innitial build-up.
Much of the heavy equippment was supposed to follow by sea. There where two problems to this, one is that we did not have our best men in the logistics bussines, and second that there simply was no suitable port to clear the cargo on Stanley. Already the limited ammount of heavy stuff, such as M-35s and Unimogs, AML-90s, OTO howitzers, AAA, food, fuel, UH-1 helos, etc, etc had comletely maxed out the navy's own transport capacity. Most of the army stuff was to be transported by ELMA (flag shipping line) and other commercial liners, but logistic problems delayed the departure of most of the cargo. IRCC RI 12, which was based on Darwin, did never get their winter gear, tents, field kitchens, heavy mortars, engineer equipment, etc, which stayed stranded at some port in Argentina.
Same about the perforated metal planks for airstrip construction (can't remember how they are named in english), the same kind used extensively in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, etc). IRCC 9000 square meters (about 4 acres) of metal planks had been readied to extend the strip at Stanley (if this was possible at all is questionable, as the old Stanley strip had a huge rock boulder on one end and a boggy area on the other end, which limited potential lengthening of the runway).
Anyhow, by the time the ship was loaded with all the goodies our logisticians had come up with, the priorities had changed, as suddenly there were five times more troops to feed on the islands. The metal planks had to be unloaded again, and wait for the next ship. Long story made short, they ended up as taxing and parking areas on San Julian airfield (a small civilian airfield) where A-4Cs and occasionally Daggers operated.
Nope, Blue Fox in the FRS.1 - Blue Vixen didn't go into service until the early 1990s with the FA.2.......
Correct, my mistake about the radar. Anyhow, even if the performance of the Blue Fox was somewhat limited, it can safely be compared with the Cyrano II on the Mirage IIIEs and or the Agave on the Super Etendards (this is in a2a mode). As it turns out, SHARs flew few CAP mission at night, while Mirage IIIs flew only a handfull escort sorties at night, close to the end of the war (a pair of Mirage IIIs from Grupo 8 being the very last argie combat planes to depart for a combat mission, callsign Pluton, at dusk on June, 13th) and SUEs where virtually grounded after the last Exocet had been fired.
Night/all weather capability was therefore not a severe handicap for the RN, as the only argie aircraft (should I say the most likely to show at night?) where Hercs, Canberras and occasionally a lonely Neptune, as most of the fighters, CAS/COIN aircraft and helos were grounded at night anyway.