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Marines To Shut Down All Tank Units


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#61 Ken Estes

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Posted 11 May 2020 - 0202 AM

That's a bit of cross purposing. The US military presence in Europe initially was viable only because of its nuclear deterrent. Ike promised the army that it could go down to 12 active divisions because it would never have to fight the USSR in Europe without tac nucs on the battlefeld. Of course, that battlefield was not US property and it became over time an imperative to beef up US conventional forces with an eye to making it a viable force without the immediate use of tac nucs. The resulting economic expenditure so stressed the USSR that it still is credited in some quarters with ending the Cold War. By the 1980s, the US buildup in active divisions and stockpiled materiel for ten more divisions in Europe amounted to our own "horde of tanks." 

 

Nonetheless, it has remained US policy not to initiate direct conflict with a nuc superpower, for fear that it could escalate to a nuclear exchange that would cast the outcome in severe doubt to say the least. There have been several proxy wars involving superpowers, but that's a different consideration not implying nucs.

 

When this discussion of revamping the USMC for a conflict with China first raised its ugly head, it naturally set off alarms in the heads of those of us who worked in military affairs in the 70s-90s, such as Bill Lind, now retired as a former military staffer in the US Senate. I too wondered right away, what was the idea of fighting China in the So China Sea with naval forces in isolation? What were the associated requirements for the US to defend the ROK, Japan and Taiwan? Was this to be a conventional war, if not what were the constraints? 

 

We remember, it was the same Ike that promised tac nucs for the US Army in Europe who also voiced his view that the US should never fight a land war on the Asian mainland. Given Chinese armaments today, we need not limit it to the mainland, I'd wager. This also goes for a certain Fake President who promised N Korea a rain of fire should Kim threaten US security. Well, US security hardly is maintained by a nuc bombardment of N Korea, which cannot fail to have lethal effects on neighboring Chinese and Russian territory. But the stupidity continues, despite the soundest US intell and military advice at hand for the xxxxx in the Oval Office.


Edited by Ken Estes, 12 May 2020 - 0424 AM.

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#62 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 11 May 2020 - 0242 AM

The USMC always struck me as having a strength, certainly compared to the US Army, in its adaptability. So from what I can tell from the future plan for the USMC, it seems they want to remodel it into an exact plan for a particular contingency against China. This is really going down the same road pioneered by the US Army in the 1950's in the Pentomic era, where they had a mindset created purely for defending West Germany with Nuclear weapons, and a formation that was bugger all use for anything else, particularly conflicts it had to fulfill in a hurry like Vietnam or Santa Domingo.  Is that an unfair comparison?


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#63 RETAC21

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Posted 11 May 2020 - 0308 AM

 

 

 

My old friend William S. Lind has waded into the fray with gusto:

 

   https://www.traditio...commit-suicide/

 

 

 

A pretty comprehensive critique and a difficult one to rebut.

 


 

I think the first of three strategic points makes a basic level mistake in assuming that since China has nuclear weapons, then a conventional war cannot happen thus implying that preparing conventional forces for possible conflict with a nuclear power is non sensible. But the US did just that during the Cold War with the Soviet Union by having as many as over 400,000 US personnel in Europe and putting so much emphasis in anti-tank capability. There was only one country with the horde of tanks. The plans for tactical and strategic nuclear strikes at 100s of locations across Europe and the Soviet Union did not stop preparation of conventional forces in facing each other.

 

 

This,

 

But not only this, achieving nuclear parity in the 70s didn't lead to the USSR de-emphasizing its conventional forces, quite the contrary, as they found that nuclear weapons provide the ultimate shield, but they still needed/wanted to yield a sword. China is doing the same path, but instead of doing it in ramdom pulses like the USSR, it's following the "Western" lead in creating sustainable, deployable forces.

 

Direct confrontation between the US and China in the seas around China is unlikely, but war by proxy in Africa and Asia remains a distinct possibility and one for which the Marine Corps should tailor its force structure (the Small Wars of the 30s)


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#64 JasonJ

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Posted 11 May 2020 - 0730 AM

 

 

 

 

My old friend William S. Lind has waded into the fray with gusto:

 

   https://www.traditio...commit-suicide/

 

 

 

A pretty comprehensive critique and a difficult one to rebut.

 


 

I think the first of three strategic points makes a basic level mistake in assuming that since China has nuclear weapons, then a conventional war cannot happen thus implying that preparing conventional forces for possible conflict with a nuclear power is non sensible. But the US did just that during the Cold War with the Soviet Union by having as many as over 400,000 US personnel in Europe and putting so much emphasis in anti-tank capability. There was only one country with the horde of tanks. The plans for tactical and strategic nuclear strikes at 100s of locations across Europe and the Soviet Union did not stop preparation of conventional forces in facing each other.

 

 

This,

 

But not only this, achieving nuclear parity in the 70s didn't lead to the USSR de-emphasizing its conventional forces, quite the contrary, as they found that nuclear weapons provide the ultimate shield, but they still needed/wanted to yield a sword. China is doing the same path, but instead of doing it in ramdom pulses like the USSR, it's following the "Western" lead in creating sustainable, deployable forces.

 

Direct confrontation between the US and China in the seas around China is unlikely, but war by proxy in Africa and Asia remains a distinct possibility and one for which the Marine Corps should tailor its force structure (the Small Wars of the 30s)

 

Yeah, good additions.


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#65 JasonJ

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Posted 11 May 2020 - 0738 AM

That's a bit of cross purposing. The US military presence in Europe initially was viable only because of its nuclear deterrent. Ike promised the army that it could go down to 12 active divisions because it would never have to fight the USSR in Europe without tac nucs on the battlefeld. Of course, that battlefield was not US property and it became over time an imperative to beef up US conventional forces with an eye to making it a viable force without the immediate use of tac nucs. The resulting economic expenditure so stressed the USSR that it still is credited in some quarters with ending the Cold War. By the 1980s, the US buildup in active divisions and stockpiled materiel for ten more divisions in Europe amounted to our own "horde of tanks." 

 

Nonetheless, it has remained US policy not to initiate direct conflict with a nuc superpower, for fear that it could escalate to a nuclear exchange that would cast the out come in severe doubt to say the least. There have been several proxy wars involving superpowers, but that's a different consideration not implying nucs.

 

When this discussion of revamping the USMC for a conflict with China first raised its ugly head, it naturally set off alarms in the heads of those of us who worked in military affairs in the 70s-90s, such as Bill Lind, now retired as a former military staffer in the US Senate. I too wondered right away, what was the idea of fighting China in the So China Sea with naval forces in isolation? What were the associated requirements for the US to defend the ROK, Japan and Taiwan? Was this to be a conventional war, if not what were the constraints? 

 

We remember, it as the same Ike that promised tac nucs for the US Army in Europe who also voiced his view that the US should never fight a land war on the Asian mainland. Given Chinese armaments today, we need not limit it to the mainland, I'd wager. This also goes for a certain Fake President who promised N Korea a rain of fire should Kim threaten US security. Well, US security hardly is maintained by a nuc bombardment of N Korea, which cannot fail to have lethal effects on neighboring Chinese and Russian territory. But the stupidity continues, despite the soundest US intell and military advice at hand for the xxxxx in the Oval Office.

So US senior individuals don't want to challenge China?

 

What tough men don't want to stick it to them?

 

Leave all the glory for Japan then? :)

 

Of course the reshaping of the USMC and general current US military actions around Taiwan whenever PLA aircraft and ships are bussing around, or the increased rate of FONOPs in the SCS are not bearing in mind a land war on the Asia continent (with the exception of the possibility of DPRK like in 2017). It's about control of the seas.


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#66 Nobu

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Posted 11 May 2020 - 2242 PM

But not only this, achieving nuclear parity in the 70s didn't lead to the USSR de-emphasizing its conventional forces, quite the contrary, as they found that nuclear weapons provide the ultimate shield, but they still needed/wanted to yield a sword. China is doing the same path, but instead of doing it in ramdom pulses like the USSR, it's following the "Western" lead in creating sustainable, deployable forces.

 

Direct confrontation between the US and China in the seas around China is unlikely, but war by proxy in Africa and Asia remains a distinct possibility and one for which the Marine Corps should tailor its force structure (the Small Wars of the 30s)

 

It would make sense, but it is simply not glamorous enough to base a redesign of the corps on.


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#67 Nobu

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Posted 11 May 2020 - 2248 PM

The USMC always struck me as having a strength, certainly compared to the US Army, in its adaptability. So from what I can tell from the future plan for the USMC, it seems they want to remodel it into an exact plan for a particular contingency against China. This is really going down the same road pioneered by the US Army in the 1950's in the Pentomic era, where they had a mindset created purely for defending West Germany with Nuclear weapons, and a formation that was bugger all use for anything else, particularly conflicts it had to fulfill in a hurry like Vietnam or Santa Domingo.  Is that an unfair comparison?

 

Not unfair, and akin to a shift of USMC focus on operations in the Skagerrak... only.

 

The Danes would be pleased I suppose.


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#68 Sardaukar

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Posted 12 May 2020 - 0328 AM

Considering South China Sea, somehow I think USMC is looking for solutions to problems they don't have...or even problems that do not exist at all.


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#69 Ken Estes

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Posted 12 May 2020 - 0330 AM


So US senior individuals don't want to challenge China?

 

What tough men don't want to stick it to them?

 

Leave all the glory for Japan then? :)

 

Of course the reshaping of the USMC and general current US military actions around Taiwan whenever PLA aircraft and ships are bussing around, or the increased rate of FONOPs in the SCS are not bearing in mind a land war on the Asia continent (with the exception of the possibility of DPRK like in 2017). It's about control of the seas.

 

 

Could be. The USMC learned in Korea that there were more Chinese than bullets at times.


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#70 JasonJ

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Posted 12 May 2020 - 0613 AM

 

So US senior individuals don't want to challenge China?

 

What tough men don't want to stick it to them?

 

Leave all the glory for Japan then? :)

 

Of course the reshaping of the USMC and general current US military actions around Taiwan whenever PLA aircraft and ships are bussing around, or the increased rate of FONOPs in the SCS are not bearing in mind a land war on the Asia continent (with the exception of the possibility of DPRK like in 2017). It's about control of the seas.

 

 

Could be. The USMC learned in Korea that there were more Chinese than bullets at times.

 

 

Well, even if the USMC is out, we still got Vietnam. Will power is an immeasurable factor.

vietnam.jpg


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#71 JasonJ

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Posted 12 May 2020 - 0625 AM

Considering South China Sea, somehow I think USMC is looking for solutions to problems they don't have...or even problems that do not exist at all.

Train or demonstrate with ARDB? No problem!

 

They can be spotted at 8:22 and 19:47 here :)


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#72 Nobu

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Posted 12 May 2020 - 1026 AM

Considering South China Sea, somehow I think USMC is looking for solutions to problems they don't have...or even problems that do not exist at all.


The benefit of such problems is that the solutions can be made up as they go along.
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#73 Nobu

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Posted 12 May 2020 - 1337 PM

That's a bit of cross purposing. The US military presence in Europe initially was viable only because of its nuclear deterrent. Ike promised the army that it could go down to 12 active divisions because it would never have to fight the USSR in Europe without tac nucs on the battlefeld. Of course, that battlefield was not US property and it became over time an imperative to beef up US conventional forces with an eye to making it a viable force without the immediate use of tac nucs. The resulting economic expenditure so stressed the USSR that it still is credited in some quarters with ending the Cold War. By the 1980s, the US buildup in active divisions and stockpiled materiel for ten more divisions in Europe amounted to our own "horde of tanks." 

 

Nonetheless, it has remained US policy not to initiate direct conflict with a nuc superpower, for fear that it could escalate to a nuclear exchange that would cast the outcome in severe doubt to say the least. There have been several proxy wars involving superpowers, but that's a different consideration not implying nucs.

 

When this discussion of revamping the USMC for a conflict with China first raised its ugly head, it naturally set off alarms in the heads of those of us who worked in military affairs in the 70s-90s, such as Bill Lind, now retired as a former military staffer in the US Senate. I too wondered right away, what was the idea of fighting China in the So China Sea with naval forces in isolation? What were the associated requirements for the US to defend the ROK, Japan and Taiwan? Was this to be a conventional war, if not what were the constraints? 

 

We remember, it was the same Ike that promised tac nucs for the US Army in Europe who also voiced his view that the US should never fight a land war on the Asian mainland.

 

His view on how the U.S. should have approached the ground fight in Vietnam may have been to allow the Vietnamese to do so.

 

Essentially ascertaining if the Vietnamese themselves felt their cause was actually worth fighting for, before relying on it.


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