Threatening a Hawaiian island in order to bring the USN out for battle would have been counterproductive from the perspective of the IJN as well based on proximity to Hawaii's un-neutralizable land-based airpower infrastructure relative to Midway's. On this rare point, the Navy and Army would probably have agreed.
Midway would have been tough to crack, but how relatively untried and raw American troops would react in battle under conditions of total Japanese naval and air dominance was not a certainty at this point in the war, just 8 weeks removed from the surrender of Wainright's 15,000 American troops to the IJA 14th Army in the Philippines Campaign.
They could very well have fought to the last man. They also could very well have laid down their arms, heads bloody but unbowed or otherwise.
Why, sorry, but other than dropping terms you evidently don't understand (operational, tactical) can you show how Midway's plan was operationally sensible?
Threaten something of the enemy's close enough for it to rescue navally, but far away enough to deny a role for its un-neutralizable land-based airpower.
Wait for the USN to come charging to the rescue.
Attrit it on its way in.
Knock its block off in Tsushima-like fashion when it arrives.
The USN not offering battle would be operationally frustrating, as the question at the IJN high command level at that point would probably be something along the lines of how many cries for rescue from surrounded American forces it would take for the USN to respond to them.
Edited by Nobu, 09 June 2019 - 1311 PM.