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1943 Invasion Of France? (Locked)


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#21 Tim the Tank Nut

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Posted 06 April 2006 - 0721 AM

Some LST's would also have rendered the DD concept unnecessary. I believe they had a few LST's there but there wasn't really a need for any DD is there were another 10-20 LST's.

Also, in June of 44 you would think a few more BB's and CA's could have been made available. What German surface fleet was left?

Lastly, the whole Point du Hoc mission could have been done by battleship guns...
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#22 R011

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Posted 06 April 2006 - 0829 AM

What did the Western Allies' world-wide order of battle look like in mid 1943 compared to mid 1944 - ie.e total number of trained divisions? (And does anyone have any good sources, especially on the net?)
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#23 CarsomyrIV

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Posted 06 April 2006 - 1405 PM

In regards to BB gunfire support for Overlord, you have to remember that the Marianas landings were taking place in the Pacific starting on June 15, so the fast battleships would be travelling with the carriers, and 7 of the Old Tubs were being used for gunfire support. Of the remaining operating BB's, only the New York could have been made available, as she was being used as a gunnery training ship off the East Coast of the US. Mississippi & WeeVee were both in drydock.

Much has been made of the lack of LVT's for Overlord, but really, the Army itself was to blame. The LVT had been pretty much a Marine endeavor, and the US Army didn't see the need for them in their own operations....until all the amphib ops that became required for the Med and Europe.

Organization & training in the use of LVT's takes time and prep, neither of which was ready by Overlord. By contrast, nearly 600 LVT's were in use at Saipan :blink:
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#24 Tim the Tank Nut

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Posted 06 April 2006 - 1515 PM

What about Rodney, Nelson, and Renown?
It would have been a nice touch to have Richelieu there, too.
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#25 KingSargent

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Posted 06 April 2006 - 1607 PM

What about Rodney, Nelson, and Renown?
It would have been a nice touch to have Richelieu there, too.

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Renown was in the shop, IIRC. One of the Nelsons was there, forget which one. Richelieu was in the Indian Ocean with British Eastern Fleet.

In the Pacific the Marianas invasion was going on at the same time as Normandy and most of the gunfire support ships were there.

The BBs did fire on Pont du Hoc - and missed. The ground is still pitted with huge craters from shells and bombs but most of the bunkers are intact. They only fired for a short time because the Rangers were landing early. And of course there were no guns in the emplacements anyway.

Re LSTs:

LSTs would not have taken the place of DD tanks. For one thing, the plan was to have the DDs launch early and arrive on the beach before the infantry. The Germans would not know what the apparent life rafts (all they would see of a DD tank were until they waded out and dropped their screens) were. The weather scuttled that plan (and most of the DD anks that launched), but picture an LST sailing in to the beach and disgorging tanks before the infantry landing craft arrived... :P :rolleyes: <_<

An LST could not have made it through the underwater obstacles, or (worse yet) been able to back out after unloading. The beachead areas were incredibly congested and LSTs are fairly clumsy at maneuvering - and big targets to be landing under fire. Using them for resupply after the beach is secure and the obstacles removed is another thing entirely.
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#26 Catalan

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Posted 06 April 2006 - 1623 PM

It should be noted that many of those fortifications on Omaha Beach also took direct shots from allied battleships. In fact, it took a direct shot into the opening of the fortification to knock it out, by basically killing the occupants.
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#27 KingSargent

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Posted 06 April 2006 - 1630 PM

What did the Western Allies' world-wide order of battle look like in mid 1943 compared to mid 1944 - ie.e total number of trained divisions? (And does anyone have any good sources, especially on the net?)

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These figures are presumably all deployed or available for combat as opposed to training:

Roughly in May 1943 there were 6 US Army, 2 USMC, and 3 ANZAC divisions in the Pacific. In May 1944 there were 17 US Army, 4 USMC, and 7 ANZAC divisions in the Pacific.

There were 4 CW divisions in Burma in May 1943, 9 in May 1944.

In May 1943 there were 14 Allied IDs, 5 ADs (+5 Independent Arm Bdes) in North Africa.

Right now, I can't find out how many divisions were with Br 9th and 10th Armies in the ME, nor troops available in England. By the end of June 1944 the Allies had landed 21 ID & AbnDs, 5 ADs (+5 IABdes) in Normandy.
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#28 JWB

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 0146 AM

What did the Western Allies' world-wide order of battle look like in mid 1943 compared to mid 1944 - ie.e total number of trained divisions? (And does anyone have any good sources, especially on the net?)

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This should provide some info> http://www.army.mil/...4/chapter17.htm
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#29 larrikin

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 0719 AM

These figures are presumably all deployed or available for combat as opposed to training:

Roughly in May 1943 there were 6 US Army, 2 USMC, and 3 ANZAC divisions in the Pacific. In May 1944 there were 17 US Army, 4 USMC, and 7 ANZAC divisions in the Pacific.

There were 4 CW divisions in Burma in May 1943, 9 in May 1944.

In May 1943 there were 14 Allied IDs, 5 ADs (+5 Independent  Arm Bdes) in North Africa.

Right now, I can't find out how many divisions were with Br 9th and 10th Armies in the ME, nor troops available in England. By the end of June 1944 the Allies had landed 21 ID & AbnDs, 5 ADs (+5 IABdes) in Normandy.

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In May 43 there were 7-8 Australian Divs, and one NZ. If a decision had been made early enough that all they were going to do was secure and garrison Papua, 6th, 7th, 9th, 1st Armd, 2nd Armd, and possibly 1st and 2nd Motorised Divs could have been available for Europe beginning from about June, and building through until late winter.
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#30 swerve

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 0736 AM

In May 43 there were 7-8 Australian Divs, and one NZ.  If a decision had been made early enough that all they were going to do was secure and garrison Papua, 6th, 7th, 9th, 1st Armd, 2nd Armd, and possibly 1st and 2nd Motorised Divs could have been available for Europe beginning from about June, and building through until late winter.



So, we have a cunning plan!

1) drop this silliness in the SW Pacific. Decide there will be no SWPA offensive.
2) drop any idea of invading the Philippines.
3) don't invade any other Pacific islands which can safely be bypassed

Divert the ground troops, landing ships & anything else therefore not needed in the Pacific to Europe, to be available for a 1943 invasion of Northern France.

How does this affect the equation?
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#31 Tim the Tank Nut

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 0749 AM

Well, it gets you a Kasserine Pass experience in Europe on an Army Group scale instead of a division scale in North Africa.
Plus, you give Japan another year or two to harvest raw materials without fear of major invasions leading to a more formidable resistance when liberation time comes.
The Germans probably won't do Kursk...
Patton doesn't slap 2 GI's and therefore leads the invasion, ultimately doing a FAR BETTER JOB than Bradley did.
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#32 CarsomyrIV

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 0819 AM

1) drop this silliness in the SW Pacific. Decide there will be no SWPA offensive.
2) drop any idea of invading the Philippines.
3) don't invade any other Pacific islands which can safely be bypassed
_________________________________________________________________

I can see some of you belong to the Europe First crowd ;)

Retaking the Philippines is essential to cutting Japan's link to her NEI oil.

The whole Solomons/Papuan campaign served to attrit the Japanese military in a big way. And Japan did not have the industrial capacity to fight such a war.

Most islands that could be bypassed, were. Peleliu stands out as a pinnacle of absurdity, though.

I would wonder how well a 43 invasion of southern France would be recieved by the American public if it meant putting a lot of Pacific operations on hold. And with the increasing amount of hulls coming out of the shipyards, having all that steel sitting at idle would not please Admiral King very much.

Also, I can't imagine Dugout Doug having his theatre of ops shut down would sit too well with him, either :lol:
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#33 larrikin

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 0917 AM

1) drop this silliness in the SW Pacific. Decide there will be no SWPA offensive.
2) drop any idea of invading the Philippines.
3) don't invade any other Pacific islands which can safely be bypassed
_________________________________________________________________

I can see some of you belong to the Europe First crowd ;)

As were the Govts and Chiefs of Staff.  It was Europe first as the principle stretegic aim.  Germany was much more dangerous than Japan and both Roosevelt and Churchill, plus all their top brass, with the exception of the USN and BugOut Doug knew.

Retaking the Philippines is essential to cutting Japan's link to her NEI oil.

Crap, if you want to stop the Japanese getting NEI oil, go after the oil itself, it would have been no bigger a job than going after the PI.

The whole Solomons/Papuan campaign served to attrit the Japanese military in a big way. And Japan did not have the industrial capacity to fight such a war.

See above, going after the NEI oil via Timor and Java would have attritted Japanese war fighting capability a hell of a lot quicker than the peripheral shit along the north coast of New Guinea and in the Solomons.  All they needed from those campaigns was to take back the north coast of Papua, and take and hold Gualdacanal, Tulagi, and Florida.  All the rest was a criminal waste of men and materiel.  Especially men.

Most islands that could be bypassed, were. Peleliu stands out as a pinnacle of absurdity, though.

I would wonder how well a 43 invasion of southern France would be recieved by the American public if it meant putting a lot of Pacific operations on hold. And with the increasing amount of hulls coming out of the shipyards, having all that steel sitting at idle would not please Admiral King very much.

The argument is not about southern France, but northern France.  Specifically making a lodgement on the Cotentin Peninsular, with C'wealth troops.  Whilst various US elements were quite happy to fight to the last Brit and Canuck in France in 43, they wouldn't go as far into the Med in 42 to make Torch really worth while.  The furthest landing should have been at Bone, which would have made a run on Tunis and Bizerte possible.  As it was the Brits had to fight tooth and nail to get the invasion to go as far in as Oran.

Also, I can't imagine Dugout Doug having his theatre of ops shut down would sit too well with him, either :lol:

My heart bleeds for BugOut Doug.  That preening prima donna killed or ruined a huge number of men for his own glory, and wasted a shit load of aircraft, ships, and shipping tonnage in the process.

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Personally, I think the Curtin Govt made two huge stratego-political mistakes during WWII. They handed over Australia warmaking to BugOut Doug, and they didn't make sure that at least one Div of the AIF, and preferably all of it, was in at the kill in Europe. The international political points for that post war would have been immense.
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#34 CarsomyrIV

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 1640 PM

Germany was much more dangerous than Japan

On the whole, probably yes. But after the Coral Sea & Midway set-backs, Japan could not be allowed to regain the initiative. I also have to wonder how much of the "Europe First" strategy was influenced by the limited striking power of the USN in 1942. Had there been naval assets to do more than just hit-and-run carrier raids, there might have been a more favorable view on taking offensive operations in the Pacific. The US certainly needed to be commited to supporting Britian all that it could, but the war in Europe wasn't what brought America into the war. The revenge motive for Pearl Harbor is what drove the public to support war.

See above, going after the NEI oil via Timor and Java would have attritted Japanese war fighting capability a hell of a lot quicker than the peripheral shit along the north coast of New Guinea and in the Solomons.


If it was dangerous to operate carrier groups in, and around the restrictive waters of Guadalcanal, I can't imagine the USN being too enthusiastic about facing even more land-based air in the NEI. The one advantage the two-pronged Pacific strategy had, IMHO, was a dispersal of IJN forces to cover both the central and the southern areas of its' defense perimeter. A single move allows the IJN to concentrate for the "decisive engagement" it had always been looking for. And an engagement in the NEI without neutralizing Japanese land-based air power first, favors the Japanese. Darwin is not close enough for fighter escort to Timor & Java, or being able to support carrier ops.

All they needed from those campaigns was to take back the north coast of Papua, and take and hold Gualdacanal, Tulagi, and Florida.  All the rest was a criminal waste of men and materiel.  Especially men.

Rabaul, and ultimately Truk, need to be neutralized in order to truly secure Moresby and sea routes to Australia. Otherwise the potential still remains for the Japanese to conduct offensive operations in the SWPA. The Cartwheel & Toenails operations also served to give the US valuable lessons in conducting amphib ops that would ultimately save lives, later on. Just my opinion, there.

The argument is not about southern France, but northern France.


My carelessness, there. I knew the discussion was about a northern landing. Have no idea why I typed in "southern." :unsure:

That preening prima donna killed or ruined a huge number of men for his own glory, and wasted a shit load of aircraft, ships, and shipping tonnage in the process.


Agreed. I'm not a big fan of Mac and I especially detest his treatment of Eichelberger and the Aussies in general, seeing as how they did the lions share of the work in defeating the Japanese in Owen Stanley Mts. and at Buna & Lae.

Edited by CarsomyrIV, 07 April 2006 - 1642 PM.

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#35 superfractal

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Posted 07 April 2006 - 1704 PM

Patton doesn't slap 2 GI's and therefore leads the invasion, ultimately doing a FAR BETTER JOB than Bradley did.

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HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA i didnt know you were a comedian too lol. :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:
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#36 Brad Sallows

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Posted 08 April 2006 - 0302 AM

The strength, or lack, of the Atlantic Wall is almost irrelevant. What is relevant are the comparable build-up rates. Getting ashore is not the problem; staying ashore is the problem. What the Pacific experts knew was how to land, and they were accustomed to dealing with enemy forces which were not linked by rail to the industrial heartland of the homeland. Big difference.

In 1944 the Allies had enough trained divisions to put roughly one division ashore each three days and had enough craft afloat to handle the wastage.

The capability to conduct a Transportation Plan in 1943 matters.

The capability to win the seagoing logistics battle in mid-ocean, not assuming the enemy is going to play into your shallow water, air-covered advantages, matters.

It was true that in 1944 the Germans had an improved tank fleet, but their anti-tank guns of choice (50, 75, 88) were already part of the inventory in 1943.
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#37 Tim the Tank Nut

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Posted 08 April 2006 - 0832 AM

Very well superfractal,
Explain in detail why Bradley was a better commander than Patton. FOcus in detail on Bradley's decision NOT to communicate with Montgomery during the closing of the Falaise Pocket.
If that isn't a convenient area for you then extrapolate on Bradley's mediocre performance during the Battle of the Bulge when Patton and Montogomery were called on to un*uck Bradley's unsuccessful deployments.
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#38 superfractal

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Posted 08 April 2006 - 1429 PM

Very well superfractal,
Explain in detail why Bradley was a better commander than Patton.  FOcus in detail on Bradley's decision NOT to communicate with Montgomery during the closing of the Falaise Pocket.
If that isn't a convenient area for you then extrapolate on Bradley's mediocre performance during the Battle of the Bulge when Patton and Montogomery were called on to un*uck Bradley's unsuccessful deployments.

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sorry i wasnt aware that Bradley had the lead in overlord, which i assume you were refering to. I was always under the impression Montgomery had the lead as he had his allied ground forces leadership taken away from him(demoted to british ground forces commander) before market garden.

But then i may well have mis read your post, or i could just be wrong as im not aware of the slapping incident.

Edited by superfractal, 08 April 2006 - 1431 PM.

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#39 Tim the Tank Nut

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Posted 08 April 2006 - 1516 PM

Bradley HATED Montgomery. Far more than Patton ever did. His unwillingness to work with Montgomery resulted in a number of difficulties for the Allies. Some reports even speculate that Montgomery was the initial impetus behind Cobra.
Bradley was in a position to create the "Bradley Legend" postwar. His reputation has fallen far with further study.
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#40 superfractal

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Posted 08 April 2006 - 1522 PM

Bradley HATED Montgomery.  Far more than Patton ever did.  His unwillingness to work with Montgomery resulted in a number of difficulties for the Allies.  Some reports even speculate that Montgomery was the initial impetus behind Cobra.
Bradley was in a position to create the "Bradley Legend" postwar.  His reputation has fallen far with further study.

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I agree i have read that too, i just thought you were saying bradley had command of overlord.

I thought it was a deliberate joke.
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