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Could The Germans Have Successfully Propagated Sealion Without Air Supremacy


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#1121 seahawk

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Posted 26 June 2020 - 1026 AM

Why would the USAAF need to bring oil (from Texas) through a submarine blockade to fill bombers based in the USA?


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#1122 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 26 June 2020 - 1127 AM

I meant the USAAF Bombers in Britain you cheb. :P


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#1123 seahawk

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Posted 26 June 2020 - 1215 PM

I meant the USAAF Bombers in Britain you cheb. :P

 

I believe his argument is about the strategic idea to built a bomber force, not the use in WW2. In a very simplified argument one could claim that it made little sense for the UK to have such a force to bomb Germany when Germany could blockade the UK and so deny them the fuel the bombers needed. Which is bogus, as it fails to consider the inability of the Germans to do so and also that large bombers make good long range MPAs and those hunt submarines.

 

But many such books go into detail and forget the larger picture.


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#1124 cjpaul

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Posted 26 June 2020 - 1904 PM

Well, I would encourage you to at least read the preview of the Lancaster book on Kindle. Im still bemused at his criticism whether it really made sense to build up a large bomber force that would require aviation fuel being brought past the U boat blockade, and makes no similar criticism of the USAAF for doing exactly the same thing.
 
I cant know if he was a German fanboi or not, but biased he most certainly is.


Given the resources poured into building those bombers, the lack of any real effectiveness (known a posteriori) and the British manpower shortages, he has a point.
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#1125 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 27 June 2020 - 0540 AM

 

I meant the USAAF Bombers in Britain you cheb. :P

 

I believe his argument is about the strategic idea to built a bomber force, not the use in WW2. In a very simplified argument one could claim that it made little sense for the UK to have such a force to bomb Germany when Germany could blockade the UK and so deny them the fuel the bombers needed. Which is bogus, as it fails to consider the inability of the Germans to do so and also that large bombers make good long range MPAs and those hunt submarines.

 

But many such books go into detail and forget the larger picture.

 

As best I can recall,he went so far as to question Britains logic in utilizing a bomber force, for which the fuel had to be brought past a blockade. Overlooking of course that the Bomber Force was built up for primarily deterrence purposes (which failed self evidently) and the U boat threat couldnt be predicted at a time when that decision was made.

 

We probably could have put more aircraft into MPAs, but of course that is a criticism that has little solidity to it, when you realise that we won the battle of the atlantic, never ran out of fuel, and eventually wrecked most of the targets we sent the bomber force against. Once again, I just cant get inside his head.


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#1126 glenn239

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Posted 27 June 2020 - 1014 AM

 

Series production of the Siebel ferry began in September 1940 at Antwerp as a joint Army–Luftwaffe venture. 160? That is some mass production.

Hint: He's making things up...again.

 

Siebel never "said" any such thing.

 

 

 

For a guy that insists Sealion was absolutely impossible, you seem very sensitive to the discussion of any variable that would have improved it.  Stuka availability, numbers of Siebels, Italian participation, etc. etc.  :^)

 

I can't dig up the extract because the research library is closed for Covid.  I recall it saying that Siebel did indicate this in the 1950's, that something like 160 Siebels were converted in 1940.


Edited by glenn239, 27 June 2020 - 1031 AM.

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#1127 glenn239

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Posted 27 June 2020 - 1030 AM

 

The book most commonly purchased together with the Sealion counteractions book is Osprey's somewhat provocatively titled "We March Against England". 

 

Robert Forcyzk, author of Where the Iron Crosses Grow, looks beyond the traditional British account of Operation Sea Lion, complete with plucky Home Guards and courageous Spitfire pilots, at the real scale of German ambition, plans and capabilities. He examines, in depth, how Operation Sea Lion fitted in with German air-sea actions around the British Isles as he shows exactly what stopped Hitler from invading Britain.

 

Hoping the SF public library has copies of both.

Peter Schenk's Operation Sealion is a much better purchase. I suspect Forcyzk decided the Germans would succeed and then did the research to "prove" it.

 

 

Covid again prevents review of either one at the moment.

 

You suspect that Forcyzk used your  own methodology in reverse, do you, of reaching the conclusion you want before starting to research the topic?   :^)

 

The comments on Forcyzk should be limited to those that have actually read his book.  While I would have to review, (and cannot currently) I don't recall We March Against England concluding that Sealion "would" succeed - did you just make that up, or was it in there somewhere?   What I seem to recall Forcyzk saying is that the basic strategy of Sealion was sound and the adaptation curve displayed by the German army was adequate.   Given his military background and presumed familiarity with the limitations of artillery in general, (I get the sense that many people that talk about optically directed naval gunnery systems at night being like Harpoon missiles have no idea how hard it is to  hit anything with a rifle even on a target range in broad daylight), he seems to have concluded that the Royal Navy could have less attrititional impact than assumed in other, more jingoistic, takes on the matter.  .  He measured the trajectory of German military adaptation and concluded that the biggest obstacle to this strategy was Hitler, not the Royal Navy.


Edited by glenn239, 27 June 2020 - 1036 AM.

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#1128 Rich

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Posted 27 June 2020 - 1251 PM

 

 

 

For a guy that insists Sealion was absolutely impossible, you seem very sensitive to the discussion of any variable that would have improved it.  Stuka availability, numbers of Siebels, Italian participation, etc. etc.  :^)

 

Back to the straw men again I see glenn. How predictable.

 

Please point out where I ever said "Sealion was absolutely impossible".

 

I am "sensitive" to:

 

1. Inability to explain away simple historical limitations to "alternate" history.

2. Inability to substantiate peek-a-boo references.

3. Alien Space Bats as serious "alternate" history.

 

You've just managed in one sentence to bring up all three.
 

 

 

I can't dig up the extract because the research library is closed for Covid.  I recall it saying that Siebel did indicate this in the 1950's, that something like 160 Siebels were converted in 1940.

 

Why an extract? How about the original, which I've referenced before? D-159, Oberst Fritz W. Siebel, Ferry Operations, (Mediterranean), May 1947, pp. 3-4.

 

"II. Functions of the Special Ferry Service
In July 1940, on the occasion of inspection of the model ferries, and the test run held on Bangdorfer Lake near Berlin, and at Emden which were attended by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, General Halder, General Jakob, and General Udet, Oberst Siebel was instructed to leave no stone unturned to motorize as many vessels as possible for the crossing, and likewise to provide a large quantity of vessels similar to the model ferry. In this connection, he was promised complete support on the part of the engineers. By the middle of September 1940, this order was executed by making available for the crossing operations a total of 391 vessels with aerial propulsion, which were assembled in the harbors and channels of Holland and Belgium."

 

Well shit dude, sorry,you got no problem, right? You got 391 of them...

 

Yeah. No, when Siebel wrote that in 1947  he managed to conflate the order to mass-produce the improved-design SF-type Siebel ferries with the total number of SF-type ferries produced during the war, 391 of them (although again his memory was not 100%, Gröner records the completion of 393 of them by pennant number, SF01 to SF393, beginning in 1941 and ending in 1944/1945.

 

NONE OF THOSE were available for a 1940 Seelöwe.

 

Earlier, on page 2, Siebel also addressed the initial attempts at ferry design, including empty aircraft gasoline tanks as floats, before describing the first "successful design, developed in July, the "Typ-B" ferry, of which "150 of this type ferry immediately were constructed and in due time stored, ready for assembly, at St. Omer."

 

Damn dude, sorry again. You got 150 Siebel ferries. Yay!

 

Sorry, no again. The Typ-B ferry utilized four standard undecked Brücko-B pontons, mounted a single aircraft engine, could carry only 50 men, or one 105mm howitzer, or one Panzer II...and was completely incapable of traversing the Channel. Siebel waffled in 1947, saying it "was seaworthy as long as it traveled in a light or moderate sea". However, even if that was true, the Typ-B was rejected by BOTH the Heer and Kriegsmarine as  not seaworthy (Schenk, p. 27). It was formally rejected on 5 September, after the Emden demonstration on 17 August (Shenk, p. 101).

 

So Siebel turned to using the larger, more seaworthy, decked "Herbert" and schwere Schiffsbrücke pontons. Beginning in late August and  early September, just three to four weeks before the last likely landing date, the first were completed and tested.

 

The Herbert ferry sections were dispatched from the Pionier depots in Austria to the Pionier Lehr-Batallion 47. on 19 August. They completed six ferries by 10 September and they arrived at Cherbourg on 15 September. Eight more were assembled at Antwerp and eight at La Tait, near Rouen by 23 September. None of these were issued pennant numbers that I can find (Schenk pp. 101-103).

 

The construction of the actual prototype "Siebel" ferry using the schwere Schiffsbrücke pontons was also begun in late August. It was tested at Emden on 31 August with three aircraft engines, which was found to be inadequate except for the final run-in at speed. So it was retested again on 4 and 5 September using the Opel truck engines, which were preferred. Construction was begun by Sonder Kommando Böndel at Antwerp, which completed 25 for Flak Korps I and II by the end of September (Schenk, pp. 103-107). Another four were completed by the end of the year and were assigned pennant numbers s.F.201-227. Ten of an "improved design were then developed, assigned pennant numbers s.F.241-250, but only four were completed.

 

Experience with the two sonder-Fähre designs - special ferries, which is what s.F. designated - led to the construction in 1941 of the improved design the - Siebel Fähre or Siebel ferry, which is what SF designated. Eventually 393, pennant number SF 1-393 were built.

 

So no, your statement that,

 

"Siebel himself said he’d completed the conversion of, what was it, 160?  Both of those things could be true at the same time, can they not?"

 

Is not true. The 150 Typ-B ferries were never used and never considered for use. Twenty-two Herbert and 25 s.F. ferries were ready by the end of September and all or most of them may have been ready for a landing attempt in the last possible September window.

 

Worse, since you have been informed of these facts before, your repetition of information you know to be not true can only be assessed as a lie on your part. Since you apparently can only reliably lie, create straw man arguments, or make shit up, Since you have repeatedly done this now for well over a decade, my patience is at an end. I can only conclude that you are a very reliable fantasist, liar, and troll, so I will quite happily ignore you except to make fun of your obvious fantasies, trolling, and lying.


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#1129 Rich

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Posted 27 June 2020 - 1321 PM

 

 

The comments on Forcyzk should be limited to those that have actually read his book.  While I would have to review, (and cannot currently) I don't recall We March Against England concluding that Sealion "would" succeed - did you just make that up, or was it in there somewhere?  

 

No shit Sherlock, so what are you doing making comments on something you obviously have never read? Try reading it yourself before you make trolling assumptions.

 

Chapter 7, "Feasibility of S-Tag, 25 September 1940", pages 243-272 comes to that exact conclusion.

 

Page 264,

 

"As discussed in the previous section, neither the RAF or the Royal Navy was likely to stop the first wave...On S-Tag the Germans would establish four lodgements and link up with their paratroops..."

 

There then follows page after page where the Germans do everything right and the British everything wrong, until Britain surrenders.

 

Then in his conclusion, page 311:

 

"If executed, Operation Sea Lion would have changed the course of World War II, but probably not decisively. Even with Britain out of the war..."

 

 

 

What I seem to recall Forcyzk saying is that the basic strategy of Sealion was sound and the adaptation curve displayed by the German army was adequate.  

 

Instead of "seem to recalling" why don't you actually read the damned thing instead of continuing to make shit up? At least its a bit better than outright lying about shit.

 

 

Given his military background and presumed familiarity with the limitations of artillery in general,

 

So making shit up is followed by a spurious appeal to authority. Neat. Argumentum ad auctoritatem, straw  man argument, and argumentum ad ignorantiam. You got the logical fallacies down pat.

 

 

(I get the sense that many people that talk about optically directed naval gunnery systems at night being like Harpoon missiles have no idea how hard it is to  hit anything with a rifle even on a target range in broad daylight),

 

And yet another straw man argument...or maybe ignoratio elenchi?

 

 

he seems to have concluded that the Royal Navy could have less attrititional impact than assumed in other, more jingoistic, takes on the matter.  . 

 

Forczyk is a retired lieutenant colonel, Armor, his assumption regarding the naval aspect is that the inadequate mine plan and a few S-Boot and U-Boot would suffice to drive off any attempt by the Royal Navy to intervene. That may not be a jingoistic take on the matter, but it is facile beyond all understanding.

 

 

He measured the trajectory of German military adaptation and concluded that the biggest obstacle to this strategy was Hitler, not the Royal Navy.

 

Ooo that sounds good, but it is actually just as simplistic a conclusion as thinking the Royal Navy only had to sail past the German barges to swamp them with its wakes.


Edited by Rich, 27 June 2020 - 1323 PM.

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