Could it be that one of the issues were that the senior officers just didn't understand how disorienting the terrain was in the forest?
This might be one of the keys as history is rich in examples where smaller forces used forest to effectively stop (and sometimes even defeat) much larger forces.
It is very hard to achieve concentration of forces and logistics in forest are murderous (especially for a at least partially motorized/mechanized force), further limiting ability to concentrate troops.
Teutoburg forest, though that was an ambush rather than a battle like Hurtgen, and in both times it was Germans against a superior enemy force. A proud military tradition apparently.
Considering the failures happening during the time frame, the common factor is the underestimation of German military capabilities. Everyone wanted it to be over by Christmas. Bradley screwed up but if you consider the factors of the rest of the Theater, with the rather simultaneous failure of Market Garden the end of Nazi Germany was going to be an attrition battle no matter what the allies did or didn't do, seems to me that a better battlefield would only have changed the kill to casualty ratio in the allies favor.
Where exactly in the blame ratio is Ike on this? He was Supreme Commander after all. I personally think he was too close to Bradley, and I think people are too harsh on Bradley, not even MacArthur gets the level of criticism he gets at some point, and got bogged down in the politics of command. The exponential decrease in allied momentum at the time was directly proportional to allied momentum. I don't think this was just logistics, rather the ego, drive and ambition of the Allied commanders.
It never ceases me to amaze me that Bradley is considered a moron for this, but Montgomery definitely was not one over Market Garden, but I have learned that even in history people have their favorites.