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#541 RETAC21

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Posted 21 July 2019 - 1206 PM

The limits were not only industrial, but also organisational, intelligence collection and processing was noticeably poor in the LW in 1940, so during the BoB a number of irrelevant t airfields were hit while other Fighter Command stations weren't attacked at all.


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#542 Rich

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Posted 21 July 2019 - 1243 PM

The limits were not only industrial, but also organisational, intelligence collection and processing was noticeably poor in the LW in 1940, so during the BoB a number of irrelevant t airfields were hit while other Fighter Command stations weren't attacked at all.

 

Indeed yes, but those were operational organizational and intelligence problems rather than strategic. What was really missing was a strategic net assessment, but the last attempt at that was 1930-1931, long before the Nazis came to power.


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#543 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 22 July 2019 - 0224 AM

 

I don't want them to do anything, they lost and I'm perfectly happy with that. But air support of the Kriegsmarine and strategic bombing of the British isles required 4 engines bombers. The failed to build enough, because they never had a fully considered view on how to use airpower, other than as an adjunct of the army.

 

Nope. The Kriegsmarine was supported by single, twin, and four-engine aircraft, but it made little difference. They bombed Britain with a large number of twin-engine bombers, because they were in close enough range that they had no real requirement for the range of a strategic bomber. That bombing failed because the Luftwaffe infrastructure build up had been sacrificed in favor of having a larger operational force. In turn, they failed to "build enough" four-engine strategic bombers because they assessed they did not have the means to do so and also simultaneously build up the rest of the Wehrmacht.

 

 

This lack of long range aircraft didn't just affect the war against Britain. It meant they couldn't hit the Soviet industrial hinterland either, which considering it was their main objective is a real oversight. And udet and Goering both are to blame for it.

 

 The blame is more widespread than that. Udet, Milch, Goering, Hitler, OKW, BdL, and etcetera...they all accepted the compromises they had to make 34-39, which came around to bite them in the ass.

 

 

Yes, but what about the bombload? By way of comparison, the luftwaffes best bomber was the Ju88, which could carry just over 3000lb of bombs. By way of comparison, even the Mosquito could carry 4000. The Lancaster could carry 14000, not to mention special bombs that could could way up to 22000. We can argue about range (it would in my view have been useful in the med perhaps more than over Britain and Ireland), but the paltry bomb-load was just one reason why they were never able to create the damage we did. The nearest they got was London in 1940, which very nearly went down in a firestorm. if it had burned to the ground might well have had a political effect that would have changed the war. Its an abhorrent thought, but the lack of weight they could bring to a strategic attack cost them the war against Britain.

 

I find difficulty in accepting that they couldnt have built up a strategic force as easily as we did, if they had the prototypes ready prewar. They were outproducing us in aircraft well before the Battle of Britain in aircraft. By the end of the Battle of Britain we were outproducing them in aircraft. In fact  Britain, despite being surrounded by U boats, subject to all kinds of blockades, manged to outproduce the Luftwaffe in aircraft by a good 2 or 3 thousand airframes by 1945. Which considering a large number of those was 4 engine aircraft is pretty extraordinary. And we didnt really begin to ramp up production of 4 engined bombers till 1941, when it was apparent it was the only means of attacking Germany.

 

Even allowing for the relative lack of resources, I find it hard to believe that Germany could not have built up a force of 2 or 3 hundred heavy bombers by 1941, if they had chose to do so. They just didnt choose to do so. They also didnt choose to have the equivalent of Lord Beaverbrook to shake up aircraft production, until it was too late to matter.

 

 

I know, it would have taken Nazi's to stop behaving like Nazi's. And thats perfectly true. :)


Edited by Stuart Galbraith, 22 July 2019 - 0234 AM.

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#544 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 22 July 2019 - 0231 AM

The limits were not only industrial, but also organisational, intelligence collection and processing was noticeably poor in the LW in 1940, so during the BoB a number of irrelevant t airfields were hit while other Fighter Command stations weren't attacked at all.

 Certainly reading James Hollands book on the Battle of Britain, he points to the Luftwaffe intelligence as being full of cronies of Goering, who told him what he wanted to hear. You have to wonder if they had good men in it, whether they could have done any better. Clearly the technical means of intelligence acquisition and distribution really didnt exist till much later. Even then they must have been subject to the same kind of politically minded fools running it.

 

One book studying the Battle of Britain pointed out that the Luftwaffe built up so quickly that, compared to the RAF, many of the technical units, not least in radio and equipment servicing, were paltry in comparison. They were pretty poor at unit repair, which is something that really hit them in the Battle of Britain.

 

So in all kinds of ways, the rapid build up actually cost the Luftwaffe dearly. And I think it cost them in the poorly integrated and managed aviation industry. Look at the waste with the number of useless prototypes they spent so much in the way of resources on! Me309, Me210, AR240, TA154, Go229, HE112, HE280. Its like they had money and time to burn. If they spent all those people making a few austere types, they would have got a lot further. But that's political patronage for you.


Edited by Stuart Galbraith, 22 July 2019 - 0233 AM.

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#545 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 22 July 2019 - 0238 AM

 

The limits were not only industrial, but also organisational, intelligence collection and processing was noticeably poor in the LW in 1940, so during the BoB a number of irrelevant t airfields were hit while other Fighter Command stations weren't attacked at all.

 

Indeed yes, but those were operational organizational and intelligence problems rather than strategic. What was really missing was a strategic net assessment, but the last attempt at that was 1930-1931, long before the Nazis came to power.

 

 

But surely that at least points to some responsibility of those who were in the key positions for not revisiting it? Because as things turned out, they really needed to.

 

Not that I see a bomber force of 1600 aircraft as we developed it. But they didnt need something that large. Certainly not till they started on Russia anyway. That he only long range aircraft was the Condor, of which they only made 276 throughout the war, which is pitiful. So was the bombload.


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#546 Ken Estes

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Posted 22 July 2019 - 1226 PM

Germany was broke by 1938-39 and war with Poland, whatever the eventual risks, was their only way out. 

 

The failure of the Blitzkrieg against Russia capstoned the remarkable seizure of
power of the German state by Hitler, who personally directed the German armed
forces and the German economy, among other matters, in 1941. As the supreme
authority for both military strategy and operational planning as well as economic
policy, he directed the offensive against Russia, choosing the strategic objectives, and
at the same time, overseeing the war economy upon which the armed forces depended
for success. Contrary to the beliefs of Germany’s friends and foes at the outset of
World War II, the German economy was no more prepared for World War II than in
1914. However, as long as military operations consisted of relatively brief pulses of
effort to, in turn, defeat Poland, occupy Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries,
and then defeat France and occupy the Balkans, the German pre-war economy
sufficed. In this way, evident weaknesses in the German economy, especially shortages
of raw materials, labor, and finances, could be accommodated or prorogued. However,
with the end of the Blitzkrieg in Russia, so died the heavily compromised economic
policy of the Germans to that point in time.
 
As is well known, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany in 1941 was
intended to be yet another brief campaign in a striking series of victories accomplished
by German arms since 1939. The German position that summer was unprecedented,
especially given the faulty economic and financial preparations of the Third Reich in
the years through 1939. Contrary to the usual view of Nazi efficiency preparing for
war with a sustained period of production and investment that yielded the successes
later dubbed Blitzkrieg by the foreign press, the pace of German rearmament staggered
during 1937–1938. In particular, the steel (and later, copper) rationing required for the
three armed services stagnated production of armaments. On the day of the Munich
Settlement, the new German priority became the preparation for war with the United
Kingdom, plus France, with presumed American support, all targeted for 1942. Yet the
1936 armaments programs for the German Army at that point would require about
a fourth of German steel production in 1939 for completion. The new goals for the
three services would require three times the 1938 production in the following year.
By the spring of 1939, the Army procurement plan lapsed into full retreat.
Ammunition production plummeted, building steel was unavailable for 300 new
infantry battalions that lived under canvas, and weapons programs experienced severe
cuts; machine gun and field artillery orders fell by at least half and those for the
current infantry rifle were ordered to stop by the fall of 1939. The tank production
originally programmed for 1,200 medium tanks between October 1938 and October
1939 was halved. At least thirty-four of the planned wartime force of 105 divisions
would suffer serious shortages of equipment. Ammunition for all would stall at a
quantity sufficient for only fourteen days heavy fighting. The circumstances for the
other services remained just as poor.
 
 
Accordingly, Hitler grasped the only straw he could, an early launch of the war he
had forecast for 1944, then 1942. As he stated to his military leaders at Berchtesgaden
on August 22, 1939, “we have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. Because
of our restrictions our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few
more years. We must act.” Hitler and Germany had run out of time.
The victories came in surprising sequence and ease, especially the fall of France.
However, the ability of the German economy to sustain the war effort remained
circumspect. It was, for instance, impossible to calculate the requirements for each and
every campaign in advance. In the case of the Russian campaign, it had to be supplied
while at the same time, Germany and Italy engaged the United Kingdom on several
fronts. For the first time, therefore, the economic priorities in 1941 were hitched to the
Blitzkrieg concept of short but hard-fought operations, leading to a rapid conclusion
on the battlefield. Accordingly, the armaments plan “Rüstungsprogramm ‘B’” would
dictate the armaments output for the eight months of October 1940–April 1941 in
order to increase the strength of the German Army and its firepower sufficient for the
rapid defeat of the Soviet Army and another victory. Before Russia was invaded, it was
presumed that the surge of production, materials and labor could be shunted to the
navy and air force for the final priority of the United Kingdom.
 
 
Strategic Bomber program? Quo Vadis?

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#547 Nobu

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Posted 22 July 2019 - 1235 PM

I see the British suffering and the war possibly being prolonged under the weight of greater Luftwaffe tonnage on target in summer 1940, but I don't see the British surrendering to the power brought to bear by airpower alone any more than other nations under similar assault that did not do so.


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#548 Rich

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Posted 22 July 2019 - 1916 PM

One book studying the Battle of Britain pointed out that the Luftwaffe built up so quickly that, compared to the RAF, many of the technical units, not least in radio and equipment servicing, were paltry in comparison. They were pretty poor at unit repair, which is something that really hit them in the Battle of Britain.

 

I think that is what I was pointing out? The Luftwaffe elected to emphasize production and creation of new flying units in its prewar buildup at the expense of spares and its ground infrastructure. Serviceability suffered due to that.

 

 

So in all kinds of ways, the rapid build up actually cost the Luftwaffe dearly. And I think it cost them in the poorly integrated and managed aviation industry. Look at the waste with the number of useless prototypes they spent so much in the way of resources on! Me309, Me210, AR240, TA154, Go229, HE112, HE280. Its like they had money and time to burn. If they spent all those people making a few austere types, they would have got a lot further. But that's political patronage for you.

 

Useless prototypes? Did you ever notice the gap between the P-40 and the P-47?

 

Seversky XP-41...proven war winner.

Curtiss XP-42...yeah, an improved P-36A was a good idea.

Republic P-43...well, at least it got into service, sort of.

Republic XP-44...let's improve the P-43!

Bell P-45...and Airacobra by any other name should smell so sweet.

Curtiss XP-45...let's improve the P-40!

 

I think you get my drift. The Germans were not unique in going down blind development alleys and with more time to refine them and less need for wartime corner cutting, some of them could have been good aircraft. Some argue the He 112 was superior to the Bf 109. You could say that the only thing wrong with the He 280 is its HeS 8 engines were marginally less reliable than the Jumo 004...and so on.


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#549 bojan

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Posted 22 July 2019 - 1952 PM

There was plenty of US, British and Soviet prototypes that turned out to be a pretty horrible. Thing is, way it worked back then, w/o computer simulations you could not really know if it was a crap until you built a thing. And sometimes horrible planes (LaGG-3) gave a birth to a pretty good ones (La-5/La-7).


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#550 Adam_S

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0406 AM

On German heavy bomber development:

 

Tooze talks a bit about this in the Wages of Destruction IIRC. Basically, the entire war effort was geared to fighting and winning a war in Russia because a victory there in 1941 is about the only way that Nazi Germany can survive in the long term. This means a couple of things. First of all, because the war would essentially be decided in 1941, little priority in terms of R&D was given to anything that wouldn't be ready to support that effort. Also, everything had to be geared to support the army which meant that any bomber designs had to be medium or light types capable of providing tactical support, not heavy strategic bombers. When it went horribly wrong outside Moscow, the Germans were behind the curve on developing new types and just as importantly new aero engines which is partly why prewar types like the Me-109 and the He-111 stayed in production right up to the end of the war.

 

The lack of advanced aero engines in the 1800hp plus class also stymied any attempt to produce any heavy bomber designs later in the war. Similar to the British, the Germans' first attempts at producing a heavy bomber involved using two advanced engines, much like the Avro Manchester of the Vickers Warwick. Unlike the Germans though, the British had the luxury of being able to switch to four engined designs as their requirements for twin engined bombers to support the army were less, and they were able to acquire several medium bomber types from the US. The Germans though needed every airframe to be able to support the army and couldn't devote limited resources to designs which were only capable of being used for strategic bombing. Initial attempts like the Ju-188 had severe problems with the airfame due to delayed and subsequently hurried development and when those issues were finally fixed, there were insurmountable issues with the engines that were supposed to go in them, such as the Jumo 222 which were never really resolved.

 

Had the Schnellbomber program been successful, it would have produced a formidable aircraft but fortunately it never worked.


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#551 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0436 AM

I see the British suffering and the war possibly being prolonged under the weight of greater Luftwaffe tonnage on target in summer 1940, but I don't see the British surrendering to the power brought to bear by airpower alone any more than other nations under similar assault that did not do so.

 

You need to read what happened to London in 1940. I forget which date was the worst bombing (I dont think it was the December campaign) but the water mains were fractured, the Thames was out, and there was no water. Some historians consider that London was on the brink of a firestorm. Many participants said there was a high wind and it was unusually warm.Would Britain have fallen if London had been destroyed? Well we know Churchill had defeated Halifax back in the summer. But would not those arguments for capitulation have arisen again if the capital city burned to a crisp with 20 thousand dead? And what would the result have been if similarly heavy bombloads had been deposited on Coventry? Or in the Baedeckers the following year, Bath, Exeter, Canterbury, all painfully easy targets for the Nazi's to reach. I warrant the death toll would have been a lot higher than the 500 or so we lost at Coventry.  Prewar British studies envisaged the bombing of the UK being absolutely critical in a few days, largely I suspect because we imagined the bomb loads were going to be a lot heavier than they were. We got lucky.

 

One can get caught up in all kinds of arguments about the nature of the nazi regime, and about all the priorities and all other kinds of things. But it comes down to the central point, if Britain went down, the war in the west was over. The US was not going to come in. There would be no liberation of France. And the best opportunity the Nazis had for that was in 1940 and 1941 with heavy bombers and VLR aircraft at sea. The British Nightfighter force didnt even really become very efficient till the latter half of 41 when they got AI radar. Previously we were sending up Blenheims and even Spitfires at night, hoping they would get lucky and sight a target to have a squirt at it. A bomber force at night would have had a near free hand. Unlike us, the Luftwaffe didnt have to solve the long range navigation problem.

 

We assume because strategic bombing did not achieve strategic political effects, it could not have done. Its difficult to quantify at what point breakdown would occur, but I would say after the year we had in 1940, it would not have taken as much as subsequent generations might think. We were a democracy, not an authoritarian regime. Such Governments remain vulnerable to what the people think. One advantage the Nazi's clearly did have.


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#552 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0441 AM

On German heavy bomber development:

 

Tooze talks a bit about this in the Wages of Destruction IIRC. Basically, the entire war effort was geared to fighting and winning a war in Russia because a victory there in 1941 is about the only way that Nazi Germany can survive in the long term. This means a couple of things. First of all, because the war would essentially be decided in 1941, little priority in terms of R&D was given to anything that wouldn't be ready to support that effort. Also, everything had to be geared to support the army which meant that any bomber designs had to be medium or light types capable of providing tactical support, not heavy strategic bombers. When it went horribly wrong outside Moscow, the Germans were behind the curve on developing new types and just as importantly new aero engines which is partly why prewar types like the Me-109 and the He-111 stayed in production right up to the end of the war.

 

The lack of advanced aero engines in the 1800hp plus class also stymied any attempt to produce any heavy bomber designs later in the war. Similar to the British, the Germans' first attempts at producing a heavy bomber involved using two advanced engines, much like the Avro Manchester of the Vickers Warwick. Unlike the Germans though, the British had the luxury of being able to switch to four engined designs as their requirements for twin engined bombers to support the army were less, and they were able to acquire several medium bomber types from the US. The Germans though needed every airframe to be able to support the army and couldn't devote limited resources to designs which were only capable of being used for strategic bombing. Initial attempts like the Ju-188 had severe problems with the airfame due to delayed and subsequently hurried development and when those issues were finally fixed, there were insurmountable issues with the engines that were supposed to go in them, such as the Jumo 222 which were never really resolved.

 

Had the Schnellbomber program been successful, it would have produced a formidable aircraft but fortunately it never worked.

 

 

Ive always wondered what would have been the result if they had prioritized this over the 177. Though again, the bombload was mediocre compared to British contemporary designs.

https://en.wikipedia.../Heinkel_He_274

 

Even the 177 showed the design capablity of being adapted to 4 engine configuration, not unlike the Manchester/Lancaster.

Heinkel_He_177_277_274-07-640x397.JPG

 

 

There is no reason why they couldnt have done that 4 years earlier, other than apparent desire to build the 177 as a divebomber.....


Edited by Stuart Galbraith, 23 July 2019 - 0445 AM.

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#553 Rick

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0450 AM

 

Germany was broke by 1938-39 and war with Poland, whatever the eventual risks, was their only way out. 

 

The failure of the Blitzkrieg against Russia capstoned the remarkable seizure of
power of the German state by Hitler, who personally directed the German armed
forces and the German economy, among other matters, in 1941. As the supreme
authority for both military strategy and operational planning as well as economic
policy, he directed the offensive against Russia, choosing the strategic objectives, and
at the same time, overseeing the war economy upon which the armed forces depended
for success. Contrary to the beliefs of Germany’s friends and foes at the outset of
World War II, the German economy was no more prepared for World War II than in
1914. However, as long as military operations consisted of relatively brief pulses of
effort to, in turn, defeat Poland, occupy Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries,
and then defeat France and occupy the Balkans, the German pre-war economy
sufficed. In this way, evident weaknesses in the German economy, especially shortages
of raw materials, labor, and finances, could be accommodated or prorogued. However,
with the end of the Blitzkrieg in Russia, so died the heavily compromised economic
policy of the Germans to that point in time.
 
As is well known, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany in 1941 was
intended to be yet another brief campaign in a striking series of victories accomplished
by German arms since 1939. The German position that summer was unprecedented,
especially given the faulty economic and financial preparations of the Third Reich in
the years through 1939. Contrary to the usual view of Nazi efficiency preparing for
war with a sustained period of production and investment that yielded the successes
later dubbed Blitzkrieg by the foreign press, the pace of German rearmament staggered
during 1937–1938. In particular, the steel (and later, copper) rationing required for the
three armed services stagnated production of armaments. On the day of the Munich
Settlement, the new German priority became the preparation for war with the United
Kingdom, plus France, with presumed American support, all targeted for 1942. Yet the
1936 armaments programs for the German Army at that point would require about
a fourth of German steel production in 1939 for completion. The new goals for the
three services would require three times the 1938 production in the following year.
By the spring of 1939, the Army procurement plan lapsed into full retreat.
Ammunition production plummeted, building steel was unavailable for 300 new
infantry battalions that lived under canvas, and weapons programs experienced severe
cuts; machine gun and field artillery orders fell by at least half and those for the
current infantry rifle were ordered to stop by the fall of 1939. The tank production
originally programmed for 1,200 medium tanks between October 1938 and October
1939 was halved. At least thirty-four of the planned wartime force of 105 divisions
would suffer serious shortages of equipment. Ammunition for all would stall at a
quantity sufficient for only fourteen days heavy fighting. The circumstances for the
other services remained just as poor.
 
 
Accordingly, Hitler grasped the only straw he could, an early launch of the war he
had forecast for 1944, then 1942. As he stated to his military leaders at Berchtesgaden
on August 22, 1939, “we have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. Because
of our restrictions our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few
more years. We must act.” Hitler and Germany had run out of time.
The victories came in surprising sequence and ease, especially the fall of France.
However, the ability of the German economy to sustain the war effort remained
circumspect. It was, for instance, impossible to calculate the requirements for each and
every campaign in advance. In the case of the Russian campaign, it had to be supplied
while at the same time, Germany and Italy engaged the United Kingdom on several
fronts. For the first time, therefore, the economic priorities in 1941 were hitched to the
Blitzkrieg concept of short but hard-fought operations, leading to a rapid conclusion
on the battlefield. Accordingly, the armaments plan “Rüstungsprogramm ‘B’” would
dictate the armaments output for the eight months of October 1940–April 1941 in
order to increase the strength of the German Army and its firepower sufficient for the
rapid defeat of the Soviet Army and another victory. Before Russia was invaded, it was
presumed that the surge of production, materials and labor could be shunted to the
navy and air force for the final priority of the United Kingdom.
 
 
Strategic Bomber program? Quo Vadis?

 

Information on the economy of the Soviet Union at this time? From what very little I know it appears they were more desperate than Germany in 1941-42.


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#554 Yama

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0534 AM

I've never actually seen a convincing alt-history about the Axis winning WW2 that didn't involve Hitler or the Japanese High Command suddenly getting brain transplants. (To be honest, the "what if Hitler was hit by a truck in 1942"-type ones seem more plausible). You want to treat WW2 like a wargame? Easy, Hitler keeps up the non-aggression pact with the SU and goes for the Med instead after losing the Battle of Britain, he wins and the world is plunged into a new dark age. That had nothing to do with Hitler's actual goals, so it's about as realistic/useful as me wondering how my life would turn out if I was born rich and good looking. :)


I find the most alt-history discussion terribly shallow, it's almost always railroaded within to speculating around few Axis premises to which usually counter-arguments are, as you say, "then Nazis wouldn't be Nazis and there would be no war at all".
Also for some reason there is seldom any talk about what mistakes Allied could have done to lose. The eventual Allied strategy is so prefixed on people's minds that it is seen as inevitable path to victory any idiot could follow on autopilot. But Allied could have done bad decisions which could have costed them the war, not in the sense "Nazi flag over the Capitol Hill" but Axis achieving their war goals. Allied could have been more foolhardy, taken more risk which then could have backfired. Certainly war in the Eastern Front 1941-42 was what is popularly referred 'a close-run thing', hardly something where end-result was predetermined.
Regarding Pacific War, there Japanese had scored their Port Arthur and Yellow Sea, but never managed to score their Tsushima. Instead they whittled down their forces in bunch of battles which ended up being whole reverse Tsushima for them. Japanese could have scored a major naval victory against USA in 1942, it would not have been Tsushima but it could have effected course of war. The reason why it didn't happen was as much to bad Japanese decisions as it was US strategy and resilience.
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#555 Yama

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0540 AM

So in all kinds of ways, the rapid build up actually cost the Luftwaffe dearly. And I think it cost them in the poorly integrated and managed aviation industry. Look at the waste with the number of useless prototypes they spent so much in the way of resources on! Me309, Me210, AR240, TA154, Go229, HE112, HE280. Its like they had money and time to burn. If they spent all those people making a few austere types, they would have got a lot further. But that's political patronage for you.

 

How did Battle and Defiant work out for you? ;) That was over 2500 Merlin-engined planes built during the period RAF was desperate over every Spitfire and Hurricane.


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#556 Rick

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0542 AM

 

I've never actually seen a convincing alt-history about the Axis winning WW2 that didn't involve Hitler or the Japanese High Command suddenly getting brain transplants. (To be honest, the "what if Hitler was hit by a truck in 1942"-type ones seem more plausible). You want to treat WW2 like a wargame? Easy, Hitler keeps up the non-aggression pact with the SU and goes for the Med instead after losing the Battle of Britain, he wins and the world is plunged into a new dark age. That had nothing to do with Hitler's actual goals, so it's about as realistic/useful as me wondering how my life would turn out if I was born rich and good looking. :)


I find the most alt-history discussion terribly shallow, it's almost always railroaded within to speculating around few Axis premises to which usually counter-arguments are, as you say, "then Nazis wouldn't be Nazis and there would be no war at all".
Also for some reason there is seldom any talk about what mistakes Allied could have done to lose. The eventual Allied strategy is so prefixed on people's minds that it is seen as inevitable path to victory any idiot could follow on autopilot. But Allied could have done bad decisions which could have costed them the war, not in the sense "Nazi flag over the Capitol Hill" but Axis achieving their war goals. Allied could have been more foolhardy, taken more risk which then could have backfired. Certainly war in the Eastern Front 1941-42 was what is popularly referred 'a close-run thing', hardly something where end-result was predetermined.
Regarding Pacific War, there Japanese had scored their Port Arthur and Yellow Sea, but never managed to score their Tsushima. Instead they whittled down their forces in bunch of battles which ended up being whole reverse Tsushima for them. Japanese could have scored a major naval victory against USA in 1942, it would not have been Tsushima but it could have effected course of war. The reason why it didn't happen was as much to bad Japanese decisions as it was US strategy and resilience.

 

Respectfully disagree. There is no way at all Japan could beat the U.S. At the most, the Japan would have lost a few years later. 


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#557 Stuart Galbraith

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0551 AM

 

So in all kinds of ways, the rapid build up actually cost the Luftwaffe dearly. And I think it cost them in the poorly integrated and managed aviation industry. Look at the waste with the number of useless prototypes they spent so much in the way of resources on! Me309, Me210, AR240, TA154, Go229, HE112, HE280. Its like they had money and time to burn. If they spent all those people making a few austere types, they would have got a lot further. But that's political patronage for you.

 

How did Battle and Defiant work out for you? ;) That was over 2500 Merlin-engined planes built during the period RAF was desperate over every Spitfire and Hurricane.

 

 

Absolutely right. Now, name another one. :) There was plenty of prototypes that failed under test, and we spent no more time on them. We ruthlessly pushed airframes that would work. Witness the Germans that spent massive resources on air frames that were largely useless. For example, the Ju388, a high altitude nightfighter built to defeat the B29. It was evident pretty quickly it was not what was needed, but they kept on developing it anyway.

 

Conversely, air-frames that were seemingly useful in the nightfighter role, such as the 215, they pulled out of service, and put in the 217 that wasnt. 

 

For the occasional flaws of the air ministry and the MAP, the ability to make good compared to the Germans is extraordinary. We were aware the Manchester was a dud by 1941, so we had the Lancaster in development that same year, in production in 42, and they were conducting 700 plane raids with it in 1943. The Germans simply could not exercise the level of self discipline and management to do something like that.

 

They certainly COULD have done. But they didnt. I suppose it would have meant they werent Nazi's anymore.


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#558 Yama

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0715 AM

Respectfully disagree. There is no way at all Japan could beat the U.S. At the most, the Japan would have lost a few years later.


"Few years laters" is a long time. Plenty of time for public to get tired, for presidents and administrations to change etc.
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#559 Rich

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 0950 AM

 

I find the most alt-history discussion terribly shallow, it's almost always railroaded within to speculating around few Axis premises to which usually counter-arguments are, as you say, "then Nazis wouldn't be Nazis and there would be no war at all".
Also for some reason there is seldom any talk about what mistakes Allied could have done to lose. The eventual Allied strategy is so prefixed on people's minds that it is seen as inevitable path to victory any idiot could follow on autopilot. But Allied could have done bad decisions which could have costed them the war, not in the sense "Nazi flag over the Capitol Hill" but Axis achieving their war goals. Allied could have been more foolhardy, taken more risk which then could have backfired. Certainly war in the Eastern Front 1941-42 was what is popularly referred 'a close-run thing', hardly something where end-result was predetermined.
Regarding Pacific War, there Japanese had scored their Port Arthur and Yellow Sea, but never managed to score their Tsushima. Instead they whittled down their forces in bunch of battles which ended up being whole reverse Tsushima for them. Japanese could have scored a major naval victory against USA in 1942, it would not have been Tsushima but it could have effected course of war. The reason why it didn't happen was as much to bad Japanese decisions as it was US strategy and resilience.

 

 

Well, we just had an example of one good way the Allies might at least prolong the war, if not lose it...strip every movable asset from the Pacific immediately after Midway and send it to the Mediterranean in order to attempt simultaneous landings in Southern France, Corsica, Sardinia, Algeria, and French Morocco. :D


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#560 Harold Jones

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Posted 23 July 2019 - 1007 AM

Considering the hatred my aunt still has for Japan I don't think dragging out the war by another 2 years would have had all that much impact on public opinion.  


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