Yup, if you add that to the fight at Brecourt Manor and Carentan that's three examples from just one unit. Now of course you could play devil's advocate and point out that the 101st Airborne were not you run of the mill Allied unit, but that was not in the original discussion parameter. Plus there are plenty of examples from the "run of the mill" too.
But I don't think that really was the original discussion parameter. Along the way somebody posted that superior numbers of Germans had *never* been defeated in WWII; any such absolute statement is ridiculous for a conflict the size of WWII.
I however think it remains fairly obvious that *in general* the Germans were better man for man in land warfare effectiveness at the sub-strategic level, especially taking WWII as a whole not just the end. Only looking through a nationalist, pro US/Brit and especially Soviet, lens, can avoid that conclusion IMHO. As Tony Evans noted, and the absolute statement above demonstrated, that superiority can certainly be exaggerated, though.
The admittedly limited and controversial quantification by Dupuy, 25% superiority to the western Allies even in '43-'44, clearly implies and in fact explicitly includes, examples that were the other way around. Regardless of whether one accepts his number it should be uncontroversial to state that *if* his number is correct, individual divisions in a given large army varied in effectivness by considerably more than 12.5% from the mean so a 25% average advantage would not rule out cases where Allied divisions were better than German ones; also pretty clearly true in cases.
On some references quoted, I can't believe anybody is seriously proposing "Band of Brothers" as objective measure of the effectiveness of the 101st Airborne. That's a valuable subjective work about what it was like from the 101st's side. But, for example the German units left behind investing Bastogne had arguably inferior combat power to the 101st and strong supporting units in Bastogne. The American hold out was a psyshological achievement, other forces in similar situations have surrendered assuming their situation was hopeless (as popular accounts depict Bastogne, because it's probably what the defenders would have concluded if morally weaker). But, Bastogne was not in objective reality a miracle of tactical achievement by inferior arms. Once you get to the level of this platoon or company defeated superior forces...of course, but doesn't refute the thesis as reasonably stated.
Also "Infantry Attacks" was at least in part Rommel's interwar advertisement for himself; it had a quite positive effect on his career. Also great book, but AFAIK nobody has correlated in detail to accounts from the other side; one partial exception is "Rommel at Caporetto" (IA depicts basically only success, first against the French, then extensively against the Romanians, then the Italians at Caporetto, and at least the last was pretty real in general). I don't think claims of general tactical level superiority of the Germans in WWII would use "Infanrty Attacks" as proof per se.
Edited by JOE BRENNAN, 06 January 2007 - 0941 AM.