He did good work on postwar nuclear strategy though. It was his efforts that made sure the British Army was not denuded under an effort to copy the American reliance on Davy Crockett, which they tried to talk us into. He also put some good work into operational analysis of attacks on U boats with resulted in depth charges being set for shallower depths, which had good results. He also proved that the convoy's could be expanded with any further escorts, which kind of flew in the face of all reason but actually seemed to reduce the number of sinkings of merchantman.
What precisely was wrong with the transportation plan? Because looking at DDay, it clearly had a positive outcome in reducing German reinforcements. Or was there was wider plan previous to this that ive ignorant of?
You mean he kept the Davy Crockett out of the British arsenal? The man was obviously mad as a hatter...
Zuckerman's "Transport Plan" as he first called it, was directed at 79 marshaling yards (he added 14 more a few weeks later) in France and the Low Countries, which he insisted had to be hit by 500-lb GP bombs of greater to inflict maximum cratering. However, it was pointed out to him that the yards he chose as targets were all in the center of, or in close proximity to, urban centers heavily populated by French, Belgian, and Dutch civilians...a notion he pooh-poohed. Then, the Ninth Air Force and RAF TAF pointed out that it might be better to strike at the railroads between the yards, causing congestion in the yards before striking them, so at least more locomotives and cars could be damaged...a notion he pooh-poohed, claiming the narrow rail lines were too hard a target and too easily repaired. Then, the tactical air forces suggested that bridges and viaducts were a good target and were harder to repair, given that damaged yard section could be repaired easily by filling a few craters and laying replacement track. He pooh-poohed the idea, claiming bridges were too small a target and so would require large numbers of heavy bombers to damage them. After a few demonstrations on bombing accuracy of bridges by light and medium low-level attacks, he finally, reluctantly gave in on that and agreed to add bridges to the target list.
Then General Spaatz pointed out a more valuable use of the heavy bombers was probably striking the German fuel production plants...yet another idea he pooh-poohed as impractical.
Finally, the Eighth Air Force Bombing Accuracy OR group, after being asked to analyze the target list, pointed out that the analysis of their Bombs and Fuzes Subgroup was that 100-lb GP bombs were more practical for hitting the yards, since it would produce more cratering area and three times the craters as an equivalent 500-lb GP load per aircraft, three to four times better chances of direct hits on locomotives, which was required for assured destruction by either bomb type...and Zuckerman pooh-poohed the ideas again, insisting on the 500-lb bombs.
Remember, he was a biologist and not a physicist.
It turned out that unless the yards were crowded with trains they were remarkably resistant to damage and easy to repair. The 500-lb bombs caused immense collateral damage in the cities and towns adjacent to the yards, resulting in somewhere between 6,000 and 20,000 civilian deaths. Allied tactical air forces soon discovered that cutting rail lines was relatively easy, since short and long bombing errors made little difference when attacking a long, straight rail section...and the dozens of cuts complicated German efforts to get repair trains to the worst blockages. The bridges too became the more important choke point, since simple damage required lowering train weights and speeds, and a destroyed bridge was almost impossible to repair in the context of the campaign length.
In other words, everything Zuckerman pooh-poohed was correct and he was wrong. It worked, mostly because the elements he initially refused to agree to were tried anyway and were found to work, and so carried out. The yard attacks eventually had a cumulative effect at reducing operational locomotive strengths since the repair facilities associated with them were destroyed or damaged, but it was the cumulative effect of the rail and bridge cuts that actually strangled the rail movements.